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On July 1, 1997, President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore
issued a visionary policy statement entitled "A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce."' Noting that Internet commerce could total tens
of billions of dollars by the turn of the century, the President asserted
that, "for this potential to be realized fully, governments must adopt a
non-regulatory, market-oriented approach to electronic commerce."'
Stating that the private sector should be allowed to lead, the President
reasoned that "[i]nnovation, expanded services, broader participation,
and lower prices will arise in a market-driven arena, not in an
environment that operates as a regulated industry."3
The President identified electronic payment systems as a key
component of a vigorous electronic marketplace, noting that new
technology has made it possible to pay for goods and services over the
Internet.4 For example, moving beyond traditional, magnetic stripe
cards,' some companies have developed "smart" cards - that is, cards
embedded with a micro-chip that can be loaded with value and used at
stores equipped with card-reading terminals.6 Soon, personal computers

1. President William J. Clinton & Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework
for Global Electronic Commerce (July 1, 1997) <http:llwww.iitf.nist.gov/
elecconm/ecomm.htm> [hereinafter GlobalElectronic Commerce]. For an alternative
vision of electronic commerce, see A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce:
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(97)157 final,
<http://www.cordis.lulespritlsrc/ecomcom.htm>.
2. GlobalElectronic Commerce,supra note 1, at "Background."
3. Id. at "Principles."
4. See id. at 1.2.
5. For many years, phone companies, transit authorities, and others have sold
prepaid cards to customers, who have used the value stored on the magnetic stripe to
make convenient, cash-free purchases. See Task Force on Stored-Value Cards, A
CommercialLawyer's Take on the ElectronicPurse: An Analysis of CommercialLaw
Issues Associated with Stored-Value Cards and Electronic Money, 52 Bus. LAW. 653,
658 (1997); John L. Douglas, Banking Law, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at B4.
6. See Gary W. Lorenz, Electronic Stored Value Payment Systems, Market
Position, and Regulatory Issues, 46 AM. U. L.REv. 1177, 1183 (1997); Katherine
Morrall, Smart CardsSignala Cashless Society,27 BANKMARKETING, Apr. 1995, at 13;
Brian W. Smith & Ramsey J. Wilson, How Best to Guide the Evolution of Electronic
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will be equipped with smart card readers, taking the stored-value concept
online.' Meanwhile, other companies have developed online credit card
systems,8 and electronic cash ("e-cash") that can be used to make
anonymous purchases on the Intemet. 9
President Clinton also noted that the commercial and technological
development ofelectronic payment systems is changing rapidly, making
it hard to develop timely and appropriate policy." Reasoning that

Currency Law, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1105, 1106 n.7 (1997).
Mondex, a British technology company, sponsors a stored-value card system that
allows users to transfer value directly from one card to another, without having to be
cleared through any bank. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information
Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and DistributedDatabases, 15 J.L. &
CoM. 395, 468 (1996). Following trials of the system in England, Canada, and the
United States, Mondex plans to introduce its system worldwide. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, EMERGING ELECTRONIC METHODS FOR MAKING RETAIL PAYMENTS 15

(1996).
7. See PC/SC Workgroup to Develop Open Technology ForIntegratingSmart
Cards and PersonalComputers, FIN. NEWS, Sept. 10, 1996, at PR Newswire.
8. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 27. For example, Visa,

MasterCard, and American Express have agreed to develop Secure Electronic
Transaction ("SET") standards to regulate the encryption of credit card numbers, and
verification of credit card use. These standards will be incorporated into Internet
browser software. See id.
9. Under the patented system operated by DigiCash, a customer uses her computer
to generate a random serial number with an associated dollar value that serves as a
digital coin. See Task Force on Stored-Value Cards, supra note 5, at 660. Her bank
adds its digital signature to the coin and then debits the customer's account. See
Froomkin, supra note 6, at 460. The bank does not read or record the serial number that
the customer assigned to her coin. See Task Force On Stored-Value Cards, supra note
5, at 661 & n.15. Next, the customer electronically transmits the coin to a merchant in
payment for goods or services. Because the coin is signed by the bank, and not the
customer, her identity is not revealed. See id. Meanwhile, the merchant can go online
to ask the bank whether the coin has already been spent. See id. at 661; Froomkin, supra
note 6, at 462. If the coin is good, the merchant deposits it in his own bank.
When compared with existing payment methods, e-cash reveals itself as the
functional equivalent of a cashier's check. See Andrew Singleton, Cash on the
Wirehead, BYTE, June 1995, at 71. Customers purchase cashier's checks from banks.
Because these checks are bank obligations, creditors accept them as cash equivalents.
See U.C.C. § 3-411 cmt. 1 (1995).
10. See Global Electronic Commerce,supranote 1, at 1.2. Although it may be too
early to develop policy, international efforts to identify key considerations have already
begun. For example, the Group of Ten (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) recently released a report that acknowledges that electronic money raises
consumer, law enforcement, and supervisory issues, and that surveys how its member
states have responded. See GROUP OF TEN, ELECTRONIC MONEY: CONSUMER
PROTECTION, LAW ENFORCEMENT, SUPERVISORY AND CROSS BORDER ISSUES (1997)
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inflexible rules and regulations could harm the nascent industry, he
advocated that electronic payment experiments be monitored on a caseby-case basis." This stance is consistent with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and the Federal Reserve Board ("Fed")
reports that have questioned whether stored-value cards should be
covered by federal deposit insurance 2 or Regulation E. 3

[hereinafter G-10 REPORT]. Without intending to imply any particular policy approach,
the G-lOReport identified four key considerations: (1) transparency, thatis, information
that allows potential users to make informed choices about the relative merits of
electronic money products; (2) the financial integrity of electronic money issuers; (3) the
technical security of electronic money schemes; and (4) the vulnerability of such
schemes to criminal activity. See id. at 28-29. The G-IO Report also urged authorities
to consider how best to design national policies to minimize impediments to the crossborder use of electronic money. See id. at 29. The G-1O Report also included an
extensive chart detailing the regulatory stance each member state has adopted with
respect to the issues examined in the report. See id. at Annex 1.
11. See Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 1, at 1.2. However, Clinton
recognized that, in the long term, government action might be necessary to ensure the
safety and soundness of electronic payment systems, to protect consumers, or to respond
to important law enforcement objections. See id.
12. The FDIC has issued regulations governing deposit insurance which can be
found at 12 C.F.R. § 330 (1996). On July 16, 1996, the FDIC released General
Counsel's Opinion No. 8, addressing whether funds that depository institutions receive
in exchange for stored-value cards are deposits subject to these regulations. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 40,490 (1996). Opinion No. 8 describes four basic stored-value card systems. The
first two systems are "Bank Primary Systems," in which the depository institution creates
the electronic value embodied in the card. In "Bank Primary - Customer Account
Systems," the depository institution maintains the funds underlying the card in the
customer's account until a merchant seeks to collect the funds. See id. Since the funds
are kept in the customer's account, they qualify for deposit insurance. See id. at 40,492.
By contrast, in "Bank Primary - Reserve Systems," when a card is issued,
corresponding funds are withdrawn from the customer's account, and paid into the
depository institution's own reserve account, where they are held until merchants make
claims for payments. See id. at 40,490. Since the depository institution has no
obligation to credit these funds to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or thrift
account, and since the depository institution does not hold these funds for a single,
specific purpose, the reserve accounts are not "deposits" within the meaning of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. See id. at 40,492-93.
The other two systems discussed in Opinion No. 8 are characterized as "Bank
Secondary Systems," because a third party holds the funds underlying the electronic
value on the stored-value card. In these systems, the depository institution merely acts
as an intermediary in collecting funds from customers in exchange for the cards. See id.
at 40,490. In "Bank Secondary - Advance Systems," the depository institution holds
customer funds for a short time before forwarding them to the third party. Since these
funds are received for a special purpose, they may qualify as insurable deposits, though
the liability would be to the third party, not the customers who bought the cards. See id.
at 40,493. However, in "Bank Secondary - Pre-Acquisition Systems," the depository
institution purchases electronic value from the third party, and then exchanges that value
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Undoubtedly, the inventors and entrepreneurs who have developed

for funds with its customers. See id. at 40,490. Because these funds are held by the third
party, rather than the depository institution, they are not subject to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act. See id. at 40,491.
13. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994),
which regulates electronic fund transfers involving consumers, is implemented by
Regulation E. See 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1996). Regulation E imposes many responsibilities
on banks, from issuing receipts to document every electronic fund transfer, see 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.9, to bearing most of the loss when fund transfers are unauthorized. See id.
§ 205.6.
Industry participants have opposed the application of Regulation E to stored-value
cards, arguing that the high cost of compliance (such as providing receipts for every
transaction) would render smart cards cost-ineffective. Industry participants also
contend that consumers should bear the loss of lost or stolen stored-value cards. See
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 42; Bill McConnell, Lawmakers
Warm to Exemptionfrom FundsLawfor Smart Cards,AM. BANKER, Oct. 4, 1995, at 4.
Meanwhile, consumer advocates have vigorously argued that Regulation E should be
applied to stored-value cards. See Jaret Seiberg, Bankers andActivists Clash on How
FarFed Should Go in Regulating Smart Cards, BANKER, Apr. 4, 1996, at 11.
In April 1996, the Fed issued proposed amendments to Regulation E that would
have made some provisions applicable to certain stored-value products. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 19,696 (May 2, 1996). However, before these amendments could become law,
Congress intervened by passing the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. By this Act, Congress
directed the Fed to conduct a study of electronic stored-value products that evaluated
whether provisions ofthe EFTA could be applied without adversely impacting the cost,
development, and operation of such products. See id. § 2601, 110 Stat. at 3009-469.
The Board was also required to consider whether allowing competitive market forces to
shape the development of electronic stored-value products would more efficiently
achieve the objectives of the EFTA. See id.
In March 1997, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued its
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
ACT TO ELECTRONIC STORED-VALUE PRODUCTS (1997), available at

<http://www.bog.frb.fed.uslboarddocs/RptCongress/eflarpLpdf> [hereinafter REPORT].
The Report is cautious in tone. Given the tremendous variety of existing and planned
stored-value products, the Board reasoned, no one set ofconsumer protections would be
appropriate for all products. See id. at 75. Moreover, providers already had significant
legal and business incentives to make disclosures and design products that consumers
found attractive. Thus, it was difficult to predict whether benefits to consumers would
outweigh the operating and opportunity costs that would arise if Regulation E were
applied to stored-value products. See id.
The Board advised that steps short ofregulation could be undertaken. For example,
the Board could issue policy statements and guidelines informing the stored-value card
industry of Board expectations for industry practices; however, such policy statements
or guidelines would not be supported by any enforcement mechanism. Consumer
education programs could also be helpful in informing consumers of their rights and
obligations; however, Congress would have to considerwhether the incremental increase
in information justified the cost of such programs. See id. at 76.

HeinOnline -- 11 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 737 1997-1998

HarvardJournalofLaw & Technology

[Vol. I11

new electronic payment systems have facilitated Internet commerce. In
many ways, however, their vision has been a conservative one, bent on
adapting more familiar payment devices, such as magnetic stripe cards,
credit cards, and cashier's checks, to the online environment.
The Internet is more than just another marketplace that happens to
be electronic, and it needs more than a way to translate traditional
payment systems to the electronic realm. In many important ways, the
Internet is a New World - a unique place that transcends geographical
or national boundaries. 4 At one end of the spectrum, the Internet has
made a truly globalcommerce possible; any person can transact business
with any other person (or computer agent), anywhere, anytime. At the
other end of the spectrum, the Internet has enabled a commerce that is
more transnational than global; individuals from different countries can
come together to form new communities, with their own trade and
micro-economies. Given the pioneering attitude expressed in the
Clinton-Gore report, it is time to entertain more radical proposals
designed to realize the full economic potential of the Internet.
Therefore, in this Article, I argue that the Internet needs its own
private electronic currencies - that is, currencies that private
individuals or companies issue, manage, and denominate independently
of any government or official money."5 Such currencies would help to
realize the potential of the Internet in two very different ways.
Part I presents the case for global electronic currencies- that is,
private electronic currencies that serve as media of exchange within the
global marketplace that the Internet has created. Reasoning by analogy
to a famous economic argument in support of private currencies, Part I
describes how private companies could issue electronic currencies. Such
currencies would reduce exchange fees, facilitate comparison shopping

14. See infra Part II.A.
15. In this Article, I have chosen to use the word "currency" rather than "money"
for two reasons. First, from a lawyer's point of view, the term "money" is often used in
a narrow sense. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code defines "money" as "a
medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and
includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization
or by agreement between two or more nations." U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1995); see Task
Force on Stored-Value Cards, supra note 5, at 670. Thus, United States dollars are
money, the Japanese yen is money, and so forth.
Second, the term "money" is associated with the concept oflegal tender- that is,
a medium of exchange that, according to law, must be accepted to discharge public or
private debts. See id. at 669. By contrast, this Article addresses private media of
exchange that would not qualify as legal tender. See id. at 670 (under federal law,
United States coins and currency are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes and
dues; checks and smart cards are not).
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within Internet sub-markets, eliminate unnecessary political and
psychological barriers to trade, and protect users against the
consequences of government-caused inflation. Moreover, global
electronic currencies would neither threaten the ability of governments
to conduct monetary and economic policy, norjeopardize the safety and
soundness of the payment system as a whole.
In contrast to Part I, which discusses currencies designed to operate
within global markets (or sub-markets), Part II addresses community
electronic currencies - that is, private electronic currencies that are
designed to circulate only within specific Internet communities. Part II
begins by recognizing that, because the Internet transcends existing
geographic and national boundaries, it offers individuals the chance to
exercise their liberty in new and exciting ways. Over time, individuals
could establish thousands of Internet communities dedicated to a wide
variety of values and goals. Reasoning by analogy to existing barter
programs, Part II explains how communities could issue their own
electronic currencies, which would serve as common media of exchange
for communities with transnational membership. Their limited
circulation would allow members to develop a sense of community
identity and social solidarity. By strengthening Internet communities,
these currencies would expand opportunities to engage in electronic
commerce.
Throughout Parts I and II, this Article identifies and discusses some
of the obstacles to the issuance of private electronic currencies under
existing law in the United States. However, analysis of such obstacles
is kept brief, for one reason. As high technology continues to evolve,
such laws must, and surely will, change. Thus, this Article seeks to
present a policy-oriented vision of what should be, rather than what is.

I. GLOBAL ELECTRONIC CURRENCIES
President Clinton has offered five principles designed to assist the
development of a vibrant, global marketplace:
(1) The private sector should lead....
(2) Governments should avoid undue restrictions on
electronic commerce....
(3) Where governmental involvement is needed, its
aim should be to support and enforce a
predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple
legal environment for commerce....
(4) Governments should recognize the unique
qualities of the Internet....
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(5) Electronic commerce over the Internet should be
facilitated on a global basis.' 6
From these principles, two broad themes emerge. First, the private
sector should lead in the development ofthe Internet; government should
follow and provide support, but try not to get in the way. This approach
is mandated by the Internet itself. According to President Clinton, "[t]he
genius and explosive success of the Internet can be attributed in part to
its decentralized nature and to its tradition of bottom-up governance."17
Second, the Internet is a unique marketplace, because it is global. Given
this fact, "[t]he legal framework supporting commercial transactions on
the Internet should be governed by consistent principles across state,
national, and international borders that lead to predictable results
regardless of the jurisdiction in which a particular buyer or seller
resides."' 8
Given these two themes, it is time to consider the possibility that
Internet commerce requires currencies that are provided by the private
sector, and specifically designed for use in a global marketplace. In this
Article, such currencies will be described as "global electronic
currencies."
Subpart A begins by outlining a well-known economic argument
that private companies- rather than government monopolies - should
provide currencies. Subparts B and C explain how private companies
could issue and successfully market their own global electronic
currencies. Subpart D outlines several ways in which global electronic
currencies would benefit electronic commerce. Subpart E then considers
the ramifications of such currencies for monetary and economic policy.
Finally, Subpart F discusses whether global electronic currencies should
be subjected to banking-style laws and regulations.
A. Hayek and the DenationalisationofMoney
Some twenty years ago, the famous Austrian economist Friedrich A.
Hayek issued a radical proposal: "to do away altogether with the
monopoly of government supplying money and to allow private
enterprise to supply the public with other media of exchange it may
prefer.""9 Hayek's proposal went well beyond the boundaries of the free
banking movement of the nineteenth century, which, as he explained,

16. Global Electronic Commerce,supra note 1,at "Principles."
17. Id. at "Principles."
18. Id.
19. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MoNEY 20 (1976).
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"agitated merely for the right to issue notes in terms of the standard
currency."2 Rather, what Hayek wanted was a free market in money,
with private enterprise offering currencies based on different standards
of value to the public.2
Hayek set forth a simple model for private currency. Institutions
(which he called "banks") would be allowed to issue notes in
competition and carry checking accounts in their own, individually
denominated currencies.22 The name or denomination that each issuer
chose for its currency would be protected like a brand name or
trademark against unauthorized use.' The currency would be made

20. Id. at 26. During the 1830s, many American states enacted free banking laws
that allowed entrepreneurs to organize banks under general incorporation laws, without
a specific charter from the legislature. See Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal
& PolicyAnalysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 61-62 (1996).
Throughout the next several decades, banks issued and circulated their own notes,
denominated in dollars. See id. at 62. However, during the Civil War, Congress enacted
laws that severely restricted the ability of state banks to issue their own notes. See id.
at 62-63. National banks continued to issue notes until 1935, when issuance of paper
currency became the exclusive province of the federal government. See id. at 64.
Free banking is of more than historical significance. There is modem literature that
supports a return to an unregulated monetary and banking system, wherein banks issue
both notes and deposits that are redeemable in a common base currency consisting of
gold, silver, or a stock ofpermanently frozen fiat money. See, e.g., George A. Selgin &
Lawrence H. White, How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money?, 4 J. ECON. LIT.
1718, 1720-22(1994). Writers from this school argue that maladroit regulation caused
the problems commonly associated with the American free banking experience (for
example, notes circulating at less than par, panics, and bank failures). See id. at 1721,
1727, 1731; Solomon, supra,at 62-64. Modem free banking advocates point instead to
nineteenth-century Scotland, where free entry and competitive note issuance resulted in
a stable banking and monetary system. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. WHITE, FREE BANKING
IN BRITAIN: THEORY, EXPERIENCE, AND DEBATE, 1800-1845, at 23-49 (1984).

Most recently, two economists have argued that electronic currency such as smart
cards could help to establish and maintain a stable free banking monetary system. See
F.X. Browne & David Cronin, Payments Technologies, FinancialInnovation, and
Laissez-FaireBanking, 15 CATO J., 101, 103-06 (1995). According to these writers, one
of the usual arguments raised against free banking is the risk that banks would issue too
many paper notes, leading to currency inflation and panics. See id. at 105. Electronic
notes would greatly minimize this risk, by returning excess claims to the issuer at the
speed of the electron. See id. at 105-06.
21. See HAYEK, supranote 19, at 21.
22. See id. at38.
23. See id. Without such protection, the currency would be vulnerable to
unauthorized minting and resulting hyperinflation. See Selgin & White, supranote 20,
at 1734.
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available to the public by short-term loans and exchanges against other
currency.24
Each issuer would regulate the quantity of its own currency, so that
currency value would remain stable relative to a diversified "basket" or
portfolio of commodities25 - i.e., value would be "stable" when
26
commodity price increases and decreases balanced each other out.
Currencies intended for specialized use within particular occupations,
industries, or lifestyles, would track commodities important to those
occupations, industries, or lifestyles.27 Other currencies intended for
international use would be based on a standardized set of wholesale
commodity prices.2 s
Hayek preferred a currency kept stable in terms of products like raw
materials, agricultural foodstuffs, and standardized industrial products.29
He reasoned that such commodities are "traded on regular markets, their
prices are promptly reported, and, at least with raw materials, are
particularly sensitive and would therefore make it possible by early
action to forestall tendencies towards general price movements (which
often show themselves in such commodities first)."30 A currency based
on such commodities would be most conducive to the stability of general
economic activity.3'
But, no matter what standard was chosen, Hayek continued, issuers
should not commit legally to maintain that particular standard. That
way, issuers could adjust the composition of the commodity basket in
accordance with changing commodity prices and public demand.32
Meanwhile, competition would force issuers to keep the value of their
currency constant by regulating the quantity of currency issued.33 The

24. See HAYEK, supra note 19, at 39.

25. See id. at 39-40.
26. See id. at 59. Recognizing that specific price movements were inherently
difficult to predict and plan for, Hayek reasoned that the public would prefer a currency
with value held stable in terms of commodities, since errors in predicting price
movements up or down would cancel each other out. See id. at 59-62.
27. See id. at 64.
28. See id. at 63-64.
29. See id. at 63.
30. Id.

31. See id. Hayek also reasoned that a commodity basket composed of raw
materials would secure for wage earners an automatic share in increased industrial
productivity. See id.
32. See id. at 40.
33. See id. at 42-44. Since most commodity prices would be quoted in terms of
competing currencies, an issuer would assess the effect of changes in its circulation, not
directly on commodity prices, but rather on the rates of exchange with the currencies

against which the commodities were chiefly traded. See id. at 51.
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financial press would serve as a watchdog, by providing up-to-date
information about private currencies, and the extent to which each
deviated from its own announced standard.34

Hayek supported his proposal by making policy arguments in favor
ofa free market in money. He reasoned that government monopoly over
the issuance of money was harmful in several ways. First, government
efforts to implement monetary policy contributed to economic
instability. By supplying too much easy money, the government not
only caused inflation, but also encouraged misdirection of production
that resulted in unemployment and depression.35 Second, "[a] good
money, like good law, must operate without regard to the effects that
decisions of the issuer will have on known groups or individuals."36
Such neutrality was impossible for a central bank controlled by a
democratic government dependent on special interests. Thus, politics
inevitably corrupted monetary policy. 37 Third, government power over
money distorted political decisions. Relieved of the necessity to keep
expenditure within revenue, governments could initiate new programs,
claim an increasingly large share ofreal output, and consolidate power.38
Also, if governments wanted more output to support more programs,
they could use inflation to push people into higher tax brackets, without
the need for new legislation.39
By contrast, Hayek reasoned, so long as several issuers of different
currencies were allowed to compete without government interference,
there would always be one or more who found it competitively

34. See id. at 44.
35. See id. at 78-79. As Hayek explained, "[a] single monopolistic governmental
agency can neither possess the information which should govern the supply of money
nor would it, if it knew what it ought to do in the general interest, usually be in a position
to act in that manner." Id. at 80.
36. Id. at 89.
37. See id. More specifically:
Once governments are given the power to benefit particular groups
or sections of the population, the mechanism of majority
government forces them to use it to gain the support of a sufficient
number of them to command a majority. The constant temptation
to meet local or sectional dissatisfaction by manipulating the
quantity of money so that more can be spent on services for those
clamouring for assistance will often be irresistible. Such
expenditure is not an appropriate remedy butnecessarily upsets the
proper functioning of the market.
Id. at 80.
at 90, 92.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 90.
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advantageous to maintain a stable value.4" A stable currency would

provide more stable business conditions."

Also, by determining the

largest amount of currency that the public was willing to hold,
competition would determine optimal supply more accurately than a
government could when acting by conscious design.42 A free market in
currency would curb inflation and reverse the trend towards increasing
government centralization and power.n3
B. The Rise of GlobalElectronic Currency
Could Hayek's vision of competing, private currencies be realized
on the Internet? Reasoning by analogy to Hayek, Subpart B explains
how private companies could issue and manage global electronic
currencies. Subpart C explains how such currencies could be marketed,
while Subpart D outlines their practical advantages. Subpart E brings
the analogy to Hayek full circle, by examining the impact of global
electronic currencies on monetary and economic policy.
1. The Basic Model
Analysis begins with a hypothetical model of one company and its
currency. Suppose that a company called "Free Market, Inc.," decided
to invent an electronic currency, named the "hayek" in memory of the
celebrated economist." Free Market could design its currency as digital
promissory "notes"" - that is, electronic promises to pay the bearer one

40. See id. at 75.
41. See id. at 79.
42. See id. at 78-79.
43. See id. at 75, 92, 99.
44. This Article is not the first to suggest a private currency named in honor of
Hayek. See, e.g., Max More, Denationalisationof Money: FriedrichHayek's Seminal
Work on Competing Private Currencies, EXTROPY #15, 2d-3d Quarter 1995, at 19,
19-20.
45. One interesting question is whether such electronic notes would be negotiable.
The answer is probably not. Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code sets forth
several conditions for negotiability. At a minimum, a negotiable instrument must be an
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a)
(1995). Apromise "means a written undertaking to pay money signed by the person
undertaking to pay." Id. § 3-103(9). An undertaking is written when it is printed,
typewritten, or otherwise intentionally reduced to tangible form. See id. § 1201(46)(1995). An electronic message, though produced through typewriting on a
keyboard, would not have tangible form; thus, an argument can be made that the
message is not "written" and not a "promise" within the meaning of the Code. See
Richard L. Field, 1996: Survey of the Year's Developments in ElectronicCashLaw and
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or more hayeks.46 To foil would-be counterfeiters, the hayek would bear
the company's digital signature,47 and be designed so that it could be
moved from one computer or storage medium to another, but not

the Laws Affecting ElectronicBanking in the UnitedStates, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 967, 972
(1997).
More importantly, the term "money" is a technical one, encompassing only media
of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government, or monetary
units of account established by intergovermmental organization or agreement between
nations. See U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1995). This narrow definition clearly excludes the
hayek, as well as the community electronic currencies discussed in Part II of this Article.
However, some scholars have theorized that contract assignment can function as
an alternative to negotiability. See David Frisch & Henry D. Gabriel, Much Ado About
Nothing: Achieving EssentialNegotiability in an Electronic Environment,31 IDAHO L.
REV. 747, 757 (1995). To implement this theory, the hayek could be structured as a
contract between Free Market and the original recipient, who could assign her right to
payment. See generally E. ALLAN FARNsWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.2, at 780 (2d ed.

1990). Then, the assignee would acquire the same right as the assignor to enforce the
promise against Free Market. See id. § 11.8, at 809-10. Enforcement rights would be
greater only if Free Market waived claims and defenses in favor of an assignee taking
in good faith, for value, and without notice of a claim or defense. See U.C.C. § 3-104
cmt. 2 (1995); cf. Frisch & Gabriel, supra, at 763-67 (some jurisdictions might not
enforce waiver-of-defense clauses; however, assignee can sue assignor for breach of
warranty).
46. Thus, the hayek would function not only as a unit of account, but also as a
medium of exchange, through the digital notes that functioned as an independent base
currency. This distinguishes the hypothetical model from another recent proposal based
on New Monetary Economics ("NME"). NME is an ironic name, since the literature
proposes elimination of base money. See Selgin & White, supra note 20, at 1736. The
unit of account would be defined physically as the market value of a bundle of specified
commodities. See Robert L. Greenfield & Leland B. Yeager, A Laissez-FaireApproach
to Monetary Stability, 15 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 302,305 (1983). There would

be no official medium of exchange (base money); rather, contracts and obligations
evaluated in the unit of account could be satisfied with an equivalent value of whatever
medium the parties designated. Seeid. The unit of account would remain stable in terms
of the designated commodity bundle because its value would not depend on
convertibility to that bundle. See id. at 306. In theory, without money whose purchasing
power depended on its quantity, there could not be price inflation or imbalances in the
business cycle. "A wrong quantity of money could no longer cause problems because
money would not exist." Id. at 305. Butsee Selgin & White, supra note 20, at 1736-42
(criticizing NME on several grounds).
A recent article has argued that rapidly improving technology in electronic payment
systems could encourage a slow, evolutionary separation of the unit of account from the
medium of exchange. See Browne & Cronin, supra note 20. According to this article,
the NME vision of a world without money would be realized through the electronic
transfer of productive liquid assets. "Trade would be executed by the instantaneous
debiting and crediting of liquid wealth accounts." Id. at 108.
47. For an explanation of digital signatures, see infra note 214.
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duplicated. Free Market would also obtain the trademarks necessary to

protect its property rights in the hayek.4" Free Market would issue the
hayek to Internet users in exchange for government money, securities,
or some other item of value.49 Company profits would consist of the

48. Under federal law, the registered owner of a trademark can bring a civil action
against a person who, without his consent, uses the same or similar mark to advertise,
distribute, or sell goods or services in a manner that is likely to cause confusion. See 15
U.S.C. § 1114 (1994); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
§ 7.03[A](1) (3d ed. 1995). Remedies available for trademark infringement include
injunctions and damages. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117 (1994); EPSTEIN, supra,
§ 7.03[C].
49. Whether Free Market, as an issuer of hayeks, would be subject to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a complex topic beyond the
scope of this Article. However, an argument can be made that the hayek should not be
considered a "security" within the meaning of the Securities Acts.
Congress defined "security" broadly, in order to encompass virtually any
instrument that might be sold as an investment. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S.
56, 61 (1989). The hayek, however, would be a currency, and not an investment. The
Security Exchange Act of 1934 expressly excludes currency from the definition of
"security." See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994). Although the Securities Act of 1933
does not expressly exclude currency from its definition of "security," see id.at § 77b(l),
at least one court has reasoned that foreign currency is not a security as defined in that
Act. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1281 & n.4
(S.D. Ohio 1996); cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1) (1994), 78c(a)(10) (under both Acts, the
term "security" does include any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on
a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency). Moreover, Free Market
should not be subject to the Securities Acts simply because it structured the hayek as a
digital "note." Both Securities Acts include "notes" within the definition of "security."
See id. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(I0). However, in Reves, the Supreme Court reasoned that this
language should not be interpreted literally, but rather should be understood against the
backdrop of Congress' purpose in regulating investments. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 62-63.
Accordingly, a presumption that a note was a security could be rebutted if the note bore
a "family resemblance" to specified categories ofnotes used for commercial, rather than
investment, purposes such as consumer financing, home mortgages, small business
loans, "character" loans, and so forth. See id. at 65. Alternatively, four factors should
be analyzed to determine whether the note had the basic characteristics of a "security."
See id. at 66-67.
Analysis of these four factors strongly suggests that a court should not consider the
hayek to be a "security." First, and most importantly, the court would determine whether
Free Market wanted to raise money for a business, or finance substantial investments,
and whether purchasers were interested primarily in the profits that the hayek would
generate. If so, the hayek would likely be a "security." See id. at 66. But Free Market
would not sell the hayek to raise business or investment capital; rather, Free Market
would simply be marketing a product, like any other good or service. Moreover,
individuals who purchased the hayek would do so because they needed an electronic
medium of exchange with a stable value. They would earn no interest, or any other
profits. See id. at 68 n.4 (profit in the context of notes includes interest).
Second, the court would examine the plan of distribution, to determine whether
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fees users paid to obtain or exchange hayeks, as well as the seigniorage
earned on hayeks in circulation.50
Free Market would regulate the quantity of the hayek to keep its
value stable relative to a commodity basket or price index. Free Market
could choose a basket or index that tracked the price fluctuations of
goods and/or services in the market as a whole. Such "universal"
currency would have the widest possible utility and circulation, both on
and, if smart card technology were employed, off the Internet.
However, since the hayek would be designed primarily for use on
the Intemet, Free Market also could choose a basket or index that was
designed to track the price fluctuations specifically of goods and services

sold over the Internet. (Presumably, a basket of this kind would include
a higher percentage of informationgoods and services.) Such currency

there was common trading in the hayek. See id. at 66. If the hayek could be offered and
sold to a broad segment of the public, this second factor could make the hayek look like
a "security." See id. at 68. However, the third factor - the reasonable expectations of
the investing public - would weigh against such a conclusion. The hayek would be
marketed as an electronic medium of exchange with a stable value, that could be used
to purchase goods and services over the Internet. Thus, the public would have no reason
to mistake the hayek for an investment- which has been recognized as the fundamental
essence of a "security." See id. at 68-69.
As a fourth and final factor, the court would have to consider whether some other
regulatory scheme significantly reduced risks associated with the hayek. See id. at 67.
As explained below, Free Market probably would not be subject to banking laws and
regulations, see infra text accompanying notes 121-25, but might have to comply with
money transmitter laws, see infra note 144. In any event, a regulatory structure designed
to manage the risks inherent in currency would be more effective than the Securities
Acts, which were designed for the very different purpose ofregulating investments. See
Reves, 494 U.S. at 61.
50. Seigniorage refers to the difference in value between the cost of a monetary
token, and what the token is worth in the market. See David G. Oedel, Why Regulate
Cybermoney?, 46 AM. U.L. REv. 1075, 1077 n.6 (1997). For an issuer of paper money
(like the dollar), seigniorage can be very valuable. Since the cost of the paper itself is
trivial, the issuer earns seigniorage equal to the implicit interest rate on the face value
of the paper during its circulation. See id.
Similarly, Free Market would earn seigniorage equal to the difference between the
cost of hayeks and the implicit interest rate on hayeks in circulation. Presumably, Free
Market's costs would decrease over time, as its new currency became better established
and more efficient. Then (as my colleague David Friedman has suggested in
conversation), Free Market could compete with other currency issuers by eliminating
exchange fees - or even by slowly deflating the hayek, so that users would, in effect,
earn interest on their currency. Although such eventual developments are outside the
scope of this Article,.I note that an interest-bearing currency might be characterized as
an investment subject to securities regulation, see supra note 49, or treated as a deposit
subject to banking laws and regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 121-25.
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could also be described as "universal," in the sense that it would
circulate throughout the cybermarket as a whole.
Or, Free Market could select a still more narrowlytailored basket or
index, so that the hayek tracked the price fluctuations of goods or
services within a particular sub-market of Internet commerce. Such
"niche" currency would circulate only within the relevant sub-market.
Traders within the sub-market could use the currency to compare prices
without investigating underlying market events. For example, suppose
an information service that cost ten hayeks in January suddenly cost
twenty hayeks in March. The purchasing power of the hayek within the
sub-market would have remained stable. Therefore, a comparison
shopper would know that the one hundred percent mark-up was
attributable to events specific to that one information service, rather than
events within the sub-market.
Free Market would hire engineers and computer experts to provide
technical designs for the hayek and its supporting software or hardware.
Although this Article does not seek to provide a technical schema, two
different types of currency design can be imagined. Free Market could
design software that would allow users to transmit hayeks electronically
over the Internet, from one computer hard drive to another."' This
product design would not require specialized hardware, and Free Market

51. This product design raises two distinct security issues. First, even if Free
Market placed its digital signature on each hayek, could wrongdoers duplicate currency
files? Free Market could respond to this risk by giving every hayek a unique serial
number. Before accepting hayeks in payment for goods and services, a merchant could
contact Free Market to verify that these particular hayeks had not been spent before.
Then, Free Market could verify the hayeks, "retire" them from service, and send the
merchant an equal number of new hayeks with new serial numbers. Cf Joshua B.
Konvisser, Coins,Notes, andBits: The CaseforLegal Tenderon the Internet, 10 HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 321, 329, 341 (1997) (U.S. government should issue electronic cash;
system could use single-use tokens to deter counterfeiting). Unfortunately, this singleuse model would involve additional processing costs, which would be passed through
to users of the currency. See id. at 342.
Second, if hayeks resided on hard drives, could users lose their currency to
computer crashes, accidental deletions, or viruses? Users could respond to these risks
by purchasing only quality computers, exercising reasonable care in maintaining
equipment and deleting files, making back-ups of currency files, and using up-to-date
virus detection programs. Users who were particularly risk-averse could even maintain
checking accounts denominated in hayeks, leaving the task of safely storing the actual
currency to banks. If the market demanded that risk of loss be further reduced, Free
Market could agree to replace hayeks, upon proof of loss. However, the cost of a
replacement program would be passed through to all users.
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could operate around the globe without establishing a physical presence
in more than one country. 2
Alternatively, Free Market could design its currency to take
advantage of smart card technology. For example, the Mondex
Company offers tamper-resistant computer-chip cards that allow users
to transfer stored-value directly from one cardholder to another.13 Free
Market could sell hayeks loaded on smart cards. 4 Then, users could
transmit the currency over the Internet to each other, using computers
equipped with card readers.5" This design would impose additional
expenses; users and merchants would have to purchase card readers, and
Free Market would have to distribute and maintain cards in multiple

countries. 6 However, this system would have a significant advantage:
users could also take their hayeks out into the "real world," and shop at
stores equipped with card readers. 7

52. See G-l0 REPORT, supra note 10, at 25.
53. See generally supra note 6. To prevent counterfeiting, Mondex has devised
extensive security features and protocols for its products. For example, under the "Value
Transfer Protocal," cryptography protects value as it passes from one Mondex card to
another. Value can only move between Mondex cards, and can only be stored on
Mondex cards. See PreparedTestimony of Tim Jones, Chief Executive, Mondex Co.,
Before the House Banking and FinancialServices Committee andDomestic andInt'l
Monetary Policy Subcomm., FED. NEWS SERV., June 11, 1996 [hereinafter Prepared
Testimony of Tim Jones].
Meanwhile, some scientists remain unconvinced that smart cards can be made
tamper-proof. Bell Communications Research ("Bellcore") scientists claim to have
found a security flaw in public key coding systems that would allow wrongdoers to
counterfeit stored-value cards, including those used by Mondex, and other European
companies. See Scientists See Possible Defect in Smart Cards,S.F. CHRON., Sept. 26,
1996, at B2. In addition, Israeli computer scientists claim to have discovered security
flaws in secret key data coding systems such as the American Data Encryption Standard.
Deliberate application of heat or radiation causes the computer chip in the card to
generate an error, which can then be used to obtain the code key and copy the card. See
John Markoff, Two IsraelisOutline New Risk to ElectronicData Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1996, at20.
The ultimate outcome of this technological debate may determine the viability of
private electronic currency programs that depend on a stored-value card vehicle.
54. The Mondex card is designed so that value expressed in different currencies can
be held on the embedded computer chip at one time. The company has recognized that
its cards could be used to support not just foreign currencies, but also private or
"artificial" currencies. See PreparedTestimony of Tim Jones,supranote 53.
55. See id.
56. See G-10 REPORT, supranote 10, at 25. To ease these burdens, Free Market
could hire local companies to distribute or maintain cards; however, such arrangements
could provide an avenue for potential exercise ofregnlatoryjurisdiction. See id.
57. See David C. Stewart, Picking Winners andLosersinDigitalCash, BANKTECH.
NEWS, Oct. 1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library; Cash Poor,ECONOMIST, May 10,
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2. A World of Competing Currencies
The foregoing model described one company (Free Market) and one
currency (the hayek). In theory, however, an unregulated market should
generate many companies and currencies that would compete for the
business of Internet users. Only the most stable and efficient currencies
would survive this competition. 8 Users would quickly abandon
currencies that suffered from fluctuating value. And just as quickly,
users would desert currencies that were too limited in their circulation.
Seeking to avoid the transaction costs of exchanging one private
currency for another, users would gravitate to more popular currencies
with greater market share. Ultimately, an optimal number of universal
currencies should emerge for use within the global electronic
marketplace. Alongside them, the market could support a myriad of
niche currencies, each operating within its individual sub-market.
Would the efficiencies generated by common currency be so great
that only one global electronic currency (of the universal type) could
survive? If such a natural monopoly existed,59 currency competition and the corrective discipline it imposed - would not last for long.
However, as critics of the prevailing government monopoly in money
have pointed out, in the absence of free competition, it is impossible to
know whether money is truly a natural monopoly.6" The same argument
can be made in the case of global electronic currencies. Even if pressure
to reduce transaction costs would otherwise encourage the emergence of
a single, dominant currency, that pressure would be counterbalanced by
other market forces - in particular, consumer desire for stable currency.
To illustrate, imagine what would happen if the hayek became so
dominant that Free Market felt free to inflate the currency. Then, users
would abandon the hayek in favor of more stable electronic currencies.
In this manner, the market could strike an effective balance between
transactional efficiency and currency stability.

1997, at S 13 (arguing that electronic currency will not succeed unless consumers can use
it in the physical, as well as the virtual, world).
58. See HAYEK, supra note 19, at 75.
59. A natural monopoly is defined as an industry where the cost of serving the
public is lower when only one firm operates. See ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R.
ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION

290 (3d ed. 1983).

60. See Roland Vaubel, Currency Competition Versus Governmental Money
Monopolies, 5 CATO J. 929, 933 (1986).
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C. Marketing the Product

As with any new product, global electronic currencies would face
a marketing challenge. How could private companies convince
prospective users that their currencies were stable, safe, and sound?
1. Self-Disclosure
The first method that companies could use to build confidence in
their currencies would be self-disclosure. As Professor Daniel Klein has
explained, "if a lack of information would prevent trusters from entering
into deals, the promisor provides the information. If his quality is high,
he has every incentive to selfdisclose, far and wide."'" Thus, companies
would have a strong incentive to advertise the most desirable
characteristics of their currencies.
For example, Free Market could release ads explaining that the
value of the hayek was designed to remain stable relative to a specified
commodity basket or price index. Also, Free Market could emphasize
its promise to redeem the hayek at a minimum value, as suggested in
Subpart C.3, infra.
After the hayek had operated long enough to establish a track
record, Free Market's ads could include statistics to prove that the
currency was stable. By comparing the purchasing power of the hayek
with that of the dollar and other currencies, Free Market could encourage
users to adopt the hayek rather than government monies that were less
stable.62
Of course, prospective users might suspect that Free Market's own
advertisements were biased or misleading in some way. Accordingly,
Free Market could also hire or encourage independent financial advisors
or companies to investigate the hayek, and report on its stability relative
to other currencies in magazines, newsletters, and newspapers, in both
print and online versions.63 Once produced, Free Market could
incorporate the results of these independent reports in its own
64
advertising.

61. Daniel B. Klein, TrustforHire: Voluntary Remediesfor Quality andSafety, in
97, 110
(Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997).
62. Klein terms such self-disclosure "competitive expose." See id. at 118.
63. See id. at 11.
64. See id.
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT
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2. Financial Health
Professor Klein has noted that companies attempt to build
confidence by emphasizing traits associated with trustworthiness, such
as company size and longevity." Similarly, a company that is known to
be in good financial health tends to advertise its own success and
stability, thereby attracting more customers.
Thus, issuers of global electronic currencies would have a strong
incentive to maintain (and disclose) a positive net worth, a portfolio of
prudent and diversified investments, and enough liquid assets to meet
redemption demands - all in an effort to convince prospective users
that their currencies could be trusted. As a recent report by the Group
of Ten industrialized nations has suggested, "[p]roviders of electronic
money also have incentives to reduce risks that could cause their product
to be unacceptable to consumers or to damage their reputation and
commercial viability....

Issuers can adopt prudent investment and

liquidity management techniques and hold assets with relatively low
credit and market risk, such as short-term government securities." 66
3. Eliminating the Risk of Hyperinflation
Private companies could increase confidence in their electronic
currencies by using contract to eliminate the risk of hyperinflation. As
explained above, Hayek believed competition forces currency issuers to
keep the value of their currencies stable in terms of the announced
commodity standard; he saw no need for issuers to make a legal
commitment to observe that standard. 67 Similarly, competition with

public and private monies gives companies a strong self-interest in
maintaining the stability of their own electronic currencies. Absent such
stability, no one would use the currencies, and the companies could not
sustain enough profits to survive.
However, after Denationalisationof Money was published, other
scholars pointed out that an issuer could hyper-inflate its own currency,
and would do so if the one-time profits from unexpected hyperinflation
exceeded than the present value of staying in business.6 8 Some have
suggested that this problem could be solved with an enforceable
repurchase clause - that is, the issuer's contractual commitment to

65. See id.
66. See G-10 REPORT, supranote 10, at 8-9.
67. See supratext accompanying notes 32-34.
68. See, e.g., Selgin & White, supranote 20, at 1734-35; Bart Taub, PrivateFiat
Money With Many Suppliers, 16 J. MONETARY ECON. 195 (1985).
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redeem its currency at a specified rate for an asset whose supply the
issuer could not augment.69
To illustrate, consider once again our hypothetical model. Free
Market could agree with users to redeem one hayek in exchange for a
minimum value equal to a specified percentage of the underlying
commodity basket. For convenience, users would not be required to take
the underlying commodities themselves, but could recover the minimum

value in more liquid assets (including, but not limited to, government
currency). Through this strategy, Free Market could increase user
confidence in the stability of its currency. The gain in confidence,
however, would be offset by a loss in flexibility. Having assumed a
contractual obligation to redeem the hayek at a minimum value fixed in
terms of a specified commodity basket,
Free Market could no longer
70
change the composition of that basket.
Assuming Free Market promised to redeem the hayek at a specified
minimum value, users would want to know that its promise could be
enforced. In assessing the prospects for enforcement, users would
consider the value of Free Market's assets. Free Market could increase
user confidence by maintaining valuable assets that were diversified to
compensate for unpredictable market fluctuations. Free Market could
reassure users further by obtaining personal guarantees from its

69. See Selgin & White, supranote 20, at 1735; see also Vaubel, supranote 60, at
932 (arguing that if there is a danger of "profit snatching" by issuers of private
currencies, money holders will prefer currencies that offer value guarantees.).
70. Hayek may have suggested a less intrusive solution to the risk of hyperinflation.
"The only legal obligation I would assume would be to redeem notes and deposits on
demand with, at the option of the holder, either 5 Swiss francs or 5 D-marks or 2 dollars
per ducat." HAYEK, supra note 19, at 39. In other words, Hayek envisioned a
redemption value that would serve as afloor below which the value of the ducat could
not fall. See id.
Similarly, perhaps Free Market could obligate itselfcontractually to redeem hayeks
at a specified minimum value (in dollars or other assets) which would be much less than
the actual redemption value of the hayek on the exchange market. Free Market could
set the minimum value so that the cost of redeeming outstanding hayeks would exceed
any profits that Free Market could make with a one-time hyperinflation. At the same
time, since the minimum redemption value would not be tied to any particular set of
commodities, Free Market would have room to experiment with the composition of its
commodity basket. My colleague David Friedman has suggested another possible
solution to the flexibility problem. Suppose Free Market promised that currency
released today would be redeemed in exchange for a specified commodity basket, but
only for the next six months. In his view, this redemption period would be long enough
to generate the necessary trust, since most users could cash in their hayeks within six
months. At the same time, this redemption period would be short enough to let Free
Market update its commodity basket as necessary to meet the evolving needs of the
marketplace.
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executive officers (who could disclose their positive net worth to the
public), or by purchasing insurance to cover the contingent liability to
redeem its currency."
Users also would consider Free Market's location to be highly
relevant in assessing the prospects for enforcement. Users would prefer
that Free Market, and its assets, be located in a country with a stable
government and with a justice system based on the rule of law.
Furthermore, just as asset diversification helps to protect property value
against unpredictable market events, jurisdictional diversification could
help to protect the enforceability of promises against unpredictable
political events. Free Market could achieve such diversification by
maintaining its operations and/or assets in not one, but several countries.
Such a move would allay the concerns of users who feared that a
particular forum would demonstrate bias in favor of Free Market or its
own citizens.
4. Association
Professor Klein gives the following account of how brand names
create trust:

The inventor-genius may create, de novo, in his
basement workshop a fantastic new tool, but he cannot
create trust in such a manner. Instead trust emerges
only as institutions age and markets adapt. The genius
in his basement has created a great invention, but he
has not produced a greatproduct.To achieve the latter
he must collaborate with those who have striven for
and acquired trust; he will find it to his best advantage
to sell his invention to Black & Decker and let the firm
offer it under the umbrella of its brand name.72

71. In other words, I am suggesting that Free Market has market incentive to
voluntarilystructure its assets or purchase insurance to reassure prospective users of the
hayek.
One author has gone further, suggesting that government could appropriately
require that any company contractually liable for redeeming a private currency be
licensed and supervised for financial soundness. See Oedel, supra note 50, at 1093-94.
In the alternative, government could requirethe company to establish a legally separate
redemption fund, or purchase insurance to cover its contingent liability to redeem. See
id.
72. Klein, supranote 61, at 123.
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Global electronic currency is like the new tool in Klein's example.
As explained in Subpart D below, this new invention would offer
significant advantages to global electronic commerce. However, the
novelty of global electronic currency, which would not be denominated
in dollars or other familiar monetary units, might generate distrust
among potential users.
Certain companies, like American Express and Thomas Cook,
already offer financial products (e.g., traveler's checks) that are trusted
and accepted worldwide. An unknown start-up company might sell its
currency invention to an established company, like American Express.
Alternatively, a private currency issuer could operate as a subsidiary of
American Express or a similar company with a reputation for financial
trustworthiness.
5. Summary
In sum, private companies could use advertising programs, strong
finances, redemption promises, and company reputation to build
consumer confidence in their global electronic currencies.
What kind of company would be most likely to succeed with this
four-point program? At first, financial service corporations that already
had an impressive portfolio of assets and a reputation for trustworthiness
might dominate the market. Free Market could turn out to be
MasterCard, American Express, or a smaller company associated with
such financial superstars. This marketing strategy would be particularly
effective for universal currencies with wide circulation, since greater
wealth and reputation would be needed to reassure users that such
currencies could be redeemed.
Over time, as the public became more comfortable with global
electronic currencies, opportunities for smaller and newer companies to
enter the market would increase. Such companies might be particularly
successful in marketing niche currencies - that is, currencies designed
to track specific indices and circulate only within sub-markets. Their
more limited wealth and reputation could still be adequate to maintain
user confidence within the relevant sub-markets.
D. Why Have GlobalElectronic Currencies?
Having explained how global electronic currencies could be issued,
managed, and marketed, this Article now confronts another important
question. Why should the Internet marketplace use such currencies,
rather than electronic cash or other electronic payment methods that are
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denominated in and represent claims to dollars or other government
currencies?
Scholars have defined three functions of currency. First, currency
is a medium of exchange,73 allowing trade to transcend barter and
operate on a more efficient basis. Second, currency provides a unit of
account, a measure ofrelative worth. 74 Third, currency serves as a store
of value of current earnings for future spending.75 In the context of the
Internet, global electronic currencies could perform each of these
functions better than electronic currencies based on government monies.
1. Medium of Exchange
Within the physical world, buyers and sellers (of goods, services or
information) are often located far apart. The Internet offers such buyers
and sellers a unique opportunity to meet and transact business within the
virtual world. "The Net enables transactions between people who do not
know, and in many cases cannot know, each other's physical location."76
Of course, each Internet buyer or seller could simply transact
business using electronic payment systems denominated in his or her
own national monies. But then, participants would not only bear the
expense and irritation of negotiating over prices stated in different units
of account;77 they would also incur foreign exchange fees. For example,
suppose an American buyer purchased information services from a
Japanese seller. Unless the Japanese seller was willing to accept dollars,
the American buyer would have to pay a service fee to a bank or other
financial institution to convert her dollars to yen. In economic terms, the
exchange fee would be a transaction cost making the deal more
expensive, and thus less efficient.
By contrast, global electronic currencies could greatly reduce (if not
entirely eliminate) the need to pay exchange fees. For example, each
user might pay a one-time exchange fee to obtain hayeks from Free
Market.7 After that, repeat transactions within the cybermarket would

73. See Smith & Wilson, supranote 6, at 1106.

74. See id.
75. See id.
76. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1371 (1996).
77. Many, if not all, electronic transactions are conducted by computer agents.
These agents could convert different units of account more cheaply, and (presumably)
with less irritation.
78. Asdiscussedinnote50,supra,competitive pressures might induce Free Market
to waive its initial exchange fees.
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simply employ the hayek. Thus, for example, the American buyer might
already be holding hayeks from a previous transaction, and could use
them to purchase the information services from the Japanese seller.
Then, the Japanese seller could use her hayeks to buy electronic products
from a French manufacturer, and so forth. As transaction costs declined,
these and other global deals would become less expensive, and more
efficient. As Dan Lynch, Chairman of CyberCash, Inc., has noted,
"[t]he ideal form of digital money will be a currency without a country,
or of all countries, infinitely exchangeable, without the expense or
inconvenience of exchanging among local denominations.""
As discussed in Subpart B.2 above, the market could, and probably
would, generate a number of competing currencies. In that case, users
around the world would employ not only hayeks, but also other
electronic media of exchange. From time to time, users would find it
necessary to convert hayeks to other global electronic currencies.
However, market discipline should ensure that such currencies did not
proliferate beyond an optimal number. If transaction costs (in the form
of exchange fees) became too high, users would trade unpopular,
expensive currencies for currencies with wider circulation and lower
costs.

Global electronic currencies are particularly relevant today, given
predictions that much Internet commerce will involve micro-transactions
and micro-payments. Commentators anticipate a future when Internet
users will pay a few pennies to read a news article, view a picture, or
play a game on the Web."0 But this future might prove uneconomical,
if users have to pay an exchange fee for each individual microtransaction. Users could avoid this problem by acquiring global
electronic currencies in large quantities (possibly paying a single
exchange fee for each currency), and then purchasing information
services from a multitude of vendors around the world.'
Granted that a common medium of exchange would be efficient,
some might question why users should prefer global electronic

79.

DANIEL C. LYNCH & LESLIE LuNDQuisT, DIGITAL MONEY: THE NEW ERA OF

INTERNET COMMERCE 122 (1996).

80. See, e.g., J.D. Mosley-Matchett, Big Bucks or Lots and Lots of Tiny Bucks,
MARKETING NEwS, Aug. 4, 1997, at 10.
81. A primitive form of global electronic currency has already emerged to support

the micro-transactions market. Known as the "Millicent," the system works this way:
Each vendor devises its own electronic currency, known as "scrip," which brokers then
sell to consumers. The consumers then use the scrip to buy products from thatparticular
vendor. Once or twice a month, the vendor redeems its scrip. Unfortunately, this system
requires consumers to use a different scrip for every vendor. See id.
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currencies, when government currencies, like the dollar, could also serve
as the common media of exchange for the entire world. However, as this
Article explains in greater detail below, users would prefer private
currencies, because they could serve not only as efficient media of
exchange, but also as politically neutral units of account, and stable
stores of value.
Moreover, even if the dollar could serve as an efficient medium of
exchange for the market as a whole, users might still prefer to use niche
currencies when trading within Internet sub-markets. To explain, recall
that Free Market had the option of creating a specialized currency, by
selecting a commodity basket or index that tracked price fluctuations of
goods or services within a particular sub-market of the Internet. Since
this currency would internalize any increases or decreases in production
cost, it would allow users to comparison shop without having to
investigate underlying market events. A currency based on the dollar,
or any other money that depended on general market and/or political
events, could not offer this informational advantage. By linking
individuals with common trading interests around the world, the Internet
could generate the critical mass necessary to support multiple niche
currencies, each serving as a common medium of exchange within its
own sub-market.
2. Unit of Account
To serve as an efficient unit of account, a currency must be more
than decimal and readily divisible. It must provide a measure of relative
worth that users can understand on a deep, nearly intuitive level.
Otherwise, 'users must expend valuable time and money, just to
determine what the currency, and its associated unit of account, really
means. Value expressed in an obscure unit of account must be
"translated" into value expressed in a familiar unit of account.
In the world today, hundreds of national currencies exist, each
establishing its own unit of account. Thus, within global electronic
commerce, transactions may be conducted in hundreds of units of
account. This is an inefficient state of affairs (even if computers could
be used to reduce the transaction costs of conversion somewhat).
However, the advent of private electronic currencies would improve
this situation. As explained above, competition should ensure that a
limited number of universal currencies emerge for use within the global
electronic marketplace. These dominant currencies could establish
transnational units of account that could be understood without
translation or calculation. Within sub-markets, niche currencies could
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perform the same function, replacing hundreds of units of account with
only a few.
In the absence of private alternatives, the unit of account employed
by some commercially important or politically powerful nation could
emerge as the de facto global standard. For example, individuals of
many nations have already learned to measure the relative worth of their
goods and services in terms of United States dollars. However, ceding
the unit of account to any one nation - particularly one as powerful as
the United States - would have a subtle, but politically and
psychologically significant, cost.
As Professors David Johnson and David Post have pointed out, in
a democratic society, the legitimacy of laws comes from the consent of
those governed. Thus, laws developed within a nation may be applied
only within its territorial boundaries.8 2 But Internet participants may be
located anywhere around the globe. There is no nation or geographically
localized set of citizens whose claim to regulate the Internet has more
legitimacy than that of any other nation or citizens." For this and other
reasons, Johnson and Post have argued that cyberspace should be
governed by its own rules, rather than territorial laws.84
Similarly, a currency can serve as an effective unit of account only
if users accept its legitimacy. The citizens of any nation are likely to
have a strong sense that their own national currency has a special
legitimacy. In a democratic society, this legitimacy may derive from the
fact that an elected government issues and manages the currency. In any
society, the fact that the government currency is designated as legal
tender adds further prestige. Tradition, national chauvinism, and
familiarity are further factors tending to establish the legitimacy of a
nation's currency in the minds of its own citizens.
Recent political events in Europe illustrate the struggle that can
result when citizens resent a "foreign" currency. A key component of
the Maastricht Treaty on European Union" is the European Monetary

82. See Johnson &Post, supra note 76, at 1369-70.
83. See id. at 1375.
84. Johnson and Post identify three other ways in which the traditional relationship
between law and physical location does not hold in cyberspace. First, the power that
governments ordinarily have to police activities within their territorial boundaries does
not extend to a cyberspace composed of electronic information that freely flows across
such boundaries. See id. at 1371-74. Second, the effects of Internet activities are not
tied to geographical location. See id. at 1375. Third, a person who enters cyberspace
does so without crossing physical borders, and thus does not receive notice that she has
become subject to new, territorial laws. See id.
85. See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The Maastricht Treaty went into effect on November
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Union,16 as implemented through the "Euro," a single European
currency. Many British citizens have opposed the Euro, viewing it as a
threat to their sovereignty.8 7 This opposition has taken on an anti-

1, 1993, following ratification by the following members of the European Union:
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and England. See Brian K. Kurzmann, Challengesto Monetary
Unificationin the European Union: Sovereignty Reigning Supreme?, 23 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 135 nn.2-3 (1994). Ultimately, the Treaty seeks to achieve the political
unification of Europe by the end of the century. See Christopher Young, The
Ramification of the Exchange Rate Collapse in Europe: Implicationsfor Monetary
Union, 13 BOSTON U. INT'L L.J. 263,265(1995). Toward this end, the Maastricht Treaty
also mandates economic and monetary union. See id. at 266; Maastricht Treaty, supra,
art. 2.
86. See Maastricht Treaty, supranote 85, art. 3a. To qualify for participation in the
European Monetary Union, each member State must satisfy four convergence criteria.
See id. art. 109j(1). These criteria were described in the Protocol on the Convergence
Criteria Referred to in Article 109j ofthe Treaty Establishing the European Community,
31 LL.M. 352 (1992) [hereinafter Convergence Protocol]. First, a State must
demonstrate that, during the year prior to examination, its average rate of inflation did
not exceed by more than 1.5% that of the three best performing member States. See id.
Second, at the time of examination, a State must not have an excessive deficit. See id.
at art. 2. In other words, a State's deficit cannot exceed 3% of gross domestic product,
and its debt cannot exceed 60% ofgross domestic product. See Maastricht Treaty, supra
note 85, art. 104c(2); Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 31 I.L.M. 352, art.1
(1992). Third, during the two years prior to examination, a State must maintain stable
exchange rates within designated European Monetary System ("EMS") currency bands.
See Convergence Protocol, supra, art. 3. (That is, a State must keep its currency stable
vis-A-vis the European Currency Unit ("ECU"). The ECU is a unit of account composed
of specific amounts of each European currency. See Kurzmann, supranote 85, at 144.
Fourth, during the year prior to examination, a State's average nominal long-term
interest rate must not have exceeded by more than 2% that of the three best performing
member States. See Convergence Protocol, supra, art. 4.
The road to monetary union has been a rocky one. In 1993, acting in response to
economic woes brought aboutby German unification, European Union finance ministers
were forced to widen the EMS currency bands for most countries from plus or minus
2.25% to plus or minus 15%. See Young, supranote 85, at 275-78. Nevertheless,
nearly every State has had some difficulty in complying with the criteria. See John-Thor
Dahlburg, Nations Edgy About Minting Euro, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 1997, at C3.
As of this writing, eleven countries are expected to qualify for admission to the
European Monetary Union, including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Britain, Denmark, and
Sweden have chosen not to participate for now. See Edmund L. Andrews, Positive
Economic DataBrings Europe Closerto Single Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1998,
at A6; Anne Swardson, Eleven Nations Meet Criteriafor New Euro Currency, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 28, 1998, at A9. Qualifying states will automatically move to a single
currency beginning on January 1,1999. See Young, supranote 85, at 274; see also infra
note 90.
87. See Kenneth J. Garcia, Major Wields Dreaded 'Euro' as CampaignIssue, S.F.
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German flavor, with cartoons depicting British politicians as puppets of
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and speculations that British money
might, in the future, display images of Kohl rather than the Queen."'
The Euro even emerged as a "hot button" issue in the 1997 election for
Prime Minister. In an unsuccessful effort to revitalize his doomed

campaign, Tory John Major played upon voter patriotism by accusing
his Labor opponent, Tony Blair, of favoring the Euro. Blair, in turn,
accused the Tories of encouraging "'a narrow, crabbed nationalism."' 89
Unlike the Euro, which will replace the national currencies of
European Union member countries," an electronic currency
denominated in United States dollars would not replace competing
currencies, and thus would not offend nationalistic sentiment quite so
strongly. Nevertheless, within a global marketplace, there is no one
nation or geographically localized set of citizens whose currency has
greater legitimacy than that of any other nation or citizens. Thus,
currency denominated in dollars would not only be unfamiliar to many
users, but also might be viewed as an offensive form of cultural
imperialism, particularly if it became the defacto standard for the entire

cybermarket.
By contrast, private currency, developed and managed without any
government involvement (whether at the national or international level),

CHRON, Apr. 28, 1997, at Al. This political opposition has had a significant impact.
The United Kingdom is not obliged to move to the final stage of economic and monetary
union unless and until its government and Parliament decide to do so. See Protocol on
Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 355. Britain has chosen not to participate in the initial
launch of the Euro on January 1, 1999. See Swardson, supra note 86.
The British have not been alone in resisting the challenge to their monetary
sovereignty. For a more detailed examination of legal and political challenges to
monetary integration, see Kurzmann, supranote 85, at 146-57.
88. See Garcia, supra note 87.
89. Id.
90. On January 1,1999, the rates atwhich qualifying State currencies are exchanged
against the Euro will be irrevocably fixed, and the Euro will become a currency in its
own right. See Maastricht Treaty, supranote 85, art. 1091(4). Thereafter, the Euro will
be the sole currency of participating States. However, during a three-year transitional
period, national currencies will be accepted as alternative expressions ofthe Euro, both
as means of denominating value in legal instruments, and as notes and coins. See
FINANCIAL LAW PANEL, LTD., ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION: THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN NATIONAL CURRENCIES AND THE EURO 8 (1996). No later than January 1,
2002, the final conversion to the Euro will begin. Over a six-month period, new Euro
notes and coins will be exchanged for national notes and coins. This process should be
complete no later than June 30,2002. See The Scenarioforthe Changeoverto the Single
Currency, 1996 O.J. (C 22) 2, para. 14 (Annex I to the conclusions of the European
Council held at Madrid on December 15-16, 1995).
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and denominated independently of national monies, would remove

political and psychological barriers to commerce, by offering a
politically neutral unit of account for the first time. Traders should have
the opportunity to choose private currencies as their units of account and

not simply be relegated to the dollar, or whatever other unit might
emerge as dominant in the absence of private currencies.
3. Store of Value
The third and final advantage of global electronic currencies is the
most significant. Such private currencies would serve as stores of value
more stable than government monies - or currency denominated in
terms of government monies.
As explained above, Hayek believed that private issuers would find
it competitively advantageous to keep currency values stable.9 For
example, Free Market could stay in business only so long as the value of
its currency was stable enough to reassure prospective users. Sellers
would not accept the hayek as payment if its value could be eroded by
inflation. Likewise, any issuer who failed to keep its currency stable
would be quickly subjected to market discipline, as disgruntled users
exercised their freedom to discontinue use of the currency.
By contrast, national currencies are subject to governmental control.
For example, the United States, acting through the Fed, works to
manipulate monetary demand and supply.92 And from the perspective

91. See supra Part I.A.
92. The Fed has three methods ofmanipulating money. First, the Fed requires banks
to maintain a certain level of reserves (e.g., currency and deposits with Federal Reserve
Banks) to secure the demand deposits of their customers. See Solomon, supra note 20,
at 65. By increasing or decreasing the reserve requirement, the Fed reduces or enlarges
the money multiplier effect, and causes banks to extend fewer or more loans. See id.
Second, the Fed engages in open market operations, by buying and selling U.S.
securities in the open market. The Fed purchases increase the money supply, since the
Fed must pay for the securities with either: (1) newly-printed dollar bills; or (2) checks
drawn on Federal Reserve Banks, which, when deposited, count as reserves enabling
banks to extend more loans. See id. Conversely, Fed sales of government securities
decrease the money supply by reducing both the number ofdollar bills in circulation and
reserves. See Oedel, supra note 50, at 1087.
Third, the Fed affects demand for money by setting the discount rate, that is, the
interest rate at which the Fed loans funds to banks. Since banks borrow primarily to
cover reserve shortages, increasing the rate makes it harder for banks to build reserves
and make loans. Decreasing the discount rate makes it easier for banks to build reserves,
meaning that more loans can be extended. See Solomon, supra note 20, at 65; Oedel,
supra note 50, at 1087.
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of the Fed, maintaining a stable currency is not the only relevant
economic goal. As Professor Lewis Solomon has explained:
[T]he federal government can more-or-less freely print
large amounts of money to cover its deficits or for
other purposes, e.g., to redistribute income and wealth
between creditors and debtors or as a means to reduce
unemployment. Subject to what the public will
tolerate in terms of domestic inflation and the
depreciation of the value of the U.S. dollar vis-A-vis
foreign currencies, virtually no limit exists with respect
to what the U.S. government can do with the nation's
money supply.93
Thus, as many Americans have found to their displeasure over the
decades, the dollar has not always served as a stable store of value.94
Moreover, now that the United States has become a big debtor nation,
there is reason to fear that the value of the dollar (so pleasingly stable in
recent years) could suffer in the future, if the government allowed
inflation to erode that debt.95 Any private currencies denominated in
dollars, and redeemable for a fixed number of dollars, would be subject
to the same pressures. The value of such parallel currencies would
fluctuate in tandem with the dollar and its economic fortunes.
Arguably, the citizens of democratic societies are obliged to take
some bitter along with the sweet. For example, even though an increase
in the money supply would produce inflation (an undesirable result), it
also could stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment (a desirable
result). If citizens do not agree with such tradeoffs, they can elect new
officials and representatives, who, in turn, can appoint new members of
central banks and other agencies charged with responsibility for
monetary policy.96

93. See Solomon, supra note 20, at 66.
94. Solomon points out that the value of the U.S. dollar has depreciated by roughly
93% from 1913 to 1993. See id. at74.
95. See Survey: The World Economy, ECONOMIsT, Oct. 7, 1995, at 23.
96. Different countries exert varying degrees ofpolitical control over central banks
and other agencies charged with managing monetary policy. For example, Germany's
Bundesbank is a model of political independence, while other European central banks
are more controlled. See Kurzmann, supranote 85, at 146-47. In the United States, the
Fed is designed to encourage its political independence. Fourteen-year terms help to
ensure that Board members are relatively immune from short-term political pressures.
However, a political connection remains: all seven Board members are appointed by the
President of the United States. See BERNARD S. KATZ, BIOGRAPHICAL DIcTIONARY OF
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This rationale does not apply, however, to those who wish to
participate in global electronic commerce. For example, a buyer or
seller located in Egypt does not benefit from increased employment in
the United States, but surely would lose if her transactional wealth were
stored in an electronic currency based on an inflated dollar. Moreover,
a buyer or seller located in Egypt has no reasonable means of
influencing United States monetary policy. Now, multiply this one
example across millions of Internet users located in about two hundred
countries. Clearly, no currency based on national money could provide
every user with an opportunity to participate in, and benefit from,
national politics and monetary policy. Moreover, given the economic
and political difficulties that European countries have encountered in
attempting to achieve the European Monetary Union,97 it seems highly
improbable that the United Nations, or any other form of international
government, could succeed in establishing an official electronic money
for the entire planet.
Global electronic currencies issued, denominated, and managed by
private companies would answer to market forces, rather than the
parochial and self-interested policies of national governments and the
various special interests they represent. Thus, issuers would have a
strong economic incentive to keep their currencies stable, making them
a better store of value. Moreover, every user - without regard to
nationality - would have an opportunity to influence company
decisions through her market choices (such as returning an unstable
currency to its issuer), making currency more democratic. For these
twin reasons - stability and control- users should, if given the choice,
prefer privately issued, denominated, and managed currencies over
national monies.
E. Would GlobalElectronicCurrenciesErode Government Power?
As explained above, Hayek believed that a free market in currencies
would not only curb inflation, misdirection of production, and other
economic woes, but also would curtail the growth of centralized

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE at xiv (1992); THrBAUTDE SAINT
PHALLE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE: AN INTENTIONAL MYSTERY 3 (1985).

Even an independent central bank or agency is often accused of using monetary
policy to achieve political results. One common charge is that the Fed lowered interest
rates right before a presidential election, thus skewing the outcome in favor of the
incumbent. See Kurzmann, supra, at 139 n.22.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
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government."
Similarly, the very prospect that global electronic
currencies might emerge has led to speculation that government could
"lose much of its vast power to tax and spend, inflate, impoverish, and
manipulate. 99

This issue is an important one. At present, companies like Free
Market probably could issue their currencies without offending federal
law.'00 The U.S. Constitution prohibits only states - not private
parties - from issuing money.'0 The few statutes that directly prohibit
issuance of private currency date from the Civil War Era and were not
drafted with electronic currency in mind; as a result, companies probably
could structure their currencies to avoid violating these ancient
statutes.0 2 To date, the United States government has shown little
interest in passing legislation to restrict the issuance of global electronic
currencies. 3 Indeed, if the Clinton-Gore report is any indication, the

98. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
99. Peter Huber, Bye-bye, Big Brother: How George Orwell's '1984' Failedto
Predictthe Blessings of Telecommunications Technology, NAT'L REv., Aug. 15, 1994,
at 48, 50.
100. Given the limited objectives stated in the introduction, supra, a thorough
discussion of whether a currency like the hayek would violate the laws of the fifty states
is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of some state-imposed limitations
on privately issued currencies, see infranotes 153 & 240; Solomon, supra note 20, at
84-85.
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Solomon, supra note 20, at 81.
102. One statute imposes fines and/or imprisonment on anyone who issues "any note,
check, memorandum, token, or other obligationfor a less sum than $1, intended to
circulate as money or to be received or used in lieu of lawful money of the United
States." 18 U.S.C. § 336 (1994) (emphasis added). This statute was originally enacted
as a means of securing a monopoly for an experimental national postage currency. See
United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366, 367 (1877); Solomon, supranote 20, at 82.
Commentators have questioned whether this statute applies to electronic currency, which
lacks the physical characteristics of coins or paper, and thus cannot be "intended to
circulate as money" within the meaning of the statute. Smith & Wilson, supra note 6,
at 1110 (quoting United States v. Roussopulous, 95 F. 977, 978 (D. Minn. 1899)). In
any event, a private company like Free Market could sidestep the statute altogether
simply by ensuring that the exchange value of its currency was greater than one dollar.
See Van Auken, 96 U.S. at 368 (holding that a note for a larger sum than one dollar is
"not within the prohibition; and is not affected by the law").
Other federal statutes prohibit issuance of metal coins or devices intended for use
as current money. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 486,491(a) (1994). The purpose of these statutes
was to prevent the coining of money in competition with the United States. See United
States v. Gellman, 44 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Minn. 1942). However, a global electronic
currency should not run afoul of these statutes. See United States v. Reiger, 163 F. Supp.
799 (D. Haw. 1958) (holding that similar language in predecessor statute applied only
to devices made of metal or metallic compounds).
103. See Smith & Wilson, supranote 6, at 1112.
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government plans not merely to tolerate, but to encourage private
innovations that benefit the Internet marketplace. Nevertheless, the
United States - along with other nations - might enact new legislation
to ban global electronic currencies, if it believed that such currencies
threatened government power.
Such a ban would be an unfortunate overreaction for several
reasons. First, global electronic currencies would not unduly complicate
daily money management. Fed members already have recognized that
stored-value cards, e-cash, and similar products do not threaten their
operations. °4 The combined value of such products is simply too small
05
to complicate the calculation of standard monetary aggregates.
Similarly, it would take a long time before global electronic currencies
designed for use on the Internet constituted a large enough portion of the
entire money supply to seriously compromise money management.
Second, global electronic currencies would not significantly limit the
ability of government to achieve economic goals through monetary
policy. The global capital market makes it possible for investors to pull
their capital out of assets denominated in inflated currencies and move
it to assets denominated in more stable currencies. Thus, in effect, the
global capital market subjects national monies to competition.0 6 As a
result, governments already face constraints in achieving economic goals
through monetary policy.0 7 For example, policies perceived as
inflationary are met with market resistance: investors move funds out of
the country,'0 8 and bond markets demand higher rates of return, thereby
braking any economic recovery that the government hoped to
encourage.' 0 9 Global electronic currencies that were significantly more
stable than government monies would pose a new and unusual
104. See id. at 1115 n.55; Slowly but Surely, Congress is Showing Interest in EBanking, BANKING POL'Y REP., Mar. 4, 1996, at 28.

105. For example, even if every U.S. citizen held $150 in stored-value cards or other
electronic currency, the total value would be less than $50 billion - an amount
considered trivial relative to the existing M1 monetary aggregate of $1 trillion. See
Smith & Wilson, supra note 6, at 1115 n.55 (citing Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Remarks at the Digital Commerce
Conference 4 (May 6, 1996)).
106. See Catherine England, Cyberbanking and Currency Competition (May 23,

1996) <http://www.cato.org/moneyconf/14mc-3.html>. Of course, monies compete
directly as well, in the foreign exchange market. This market is not only global, but
enormous. As of 1992, some $900 billion per day were moving through it. See Survey:
The World Economy, supra note 95, at 9-10.
107. See England, supranote 106, at 7.
108. See id.; Richard O'Brien, Who Rules the World's FinancialMarkets?, HARV.
Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 144, 150.
109. See Survey: The World Economy, supra note 95, at 15.
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competitive threat. However, it seems unlikely that investors would
altogether abandon assets denominated in familiar and trusted
government monies. More probably, global electronic currencies would
increase competition, particularly on the Internet, while still leaving
room for government to effect monetary policy."
More importantly, many economists argue that encouraging growth
through inflationary policies is short-sighted and counterproductive, and
that a better environment for investment and growth is one where prices
are stable."' If true, then global electronic currencies would support,
rather than undermine, government policy, by providing the global
electronic marketplace with a stable currency.
Third, despite occasional predictions to the contrary, global
electronic currencies would not seriously threaten the political power of
government. According to Hayek, government control over the money
supply encourages deficit spending and promotes an undesirable
centralization of political power."' However, these problems could be
eliminated entirely only if nations not only tolerated private currencies
but also relinquished sovereign power over their own monies - a highly
unlikely prospect."3 The mere existence of alternative currencies would
not eliminate this sovereign power and thus could not bring about
significant decentralization of political power.
Loss of seigniorage" 4 is perhaps the most serious damage that
global electronic currencies could inflict on government prerogatives.
Every person who holds a dollar bill is, in effect, making an interest-free
loan to the U.S. government. In 1994 alone, the aggregate value of the
interest-free loan extended by all such holders to the government was
nearly twenty billion dollars."' Traveler's checks, stored-value cards,
and the like have the effect of redirecting seigniorage from government

110. Cf. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 46 (concluding that
expected size of market for stored-value cards and electronic cash is sufficiently small
that conduct of monetary policy will probably not be seriously affected).
111. Seeid. at ll.
112. See HAYEK, supra note 19, at 90, 92; Solomon, supra note 20, at 66.
113. For an account of how reluctance to abandon monetary sovereignty has
challenged the European Monetary Union under the Maastricht Treaty, see Kurzmann,
supranote 85.
114. For a formal definition of seigniorage, see supra note 50.
115. See Lorenz, supra note 6, at 1203 (quoting The Future of Money - Part2:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Intl Monetary Policy of the House
Comm. on Banking & Fin.Servs., 104th Cong. 63 (1995) (statement ofAlan S. Blinder,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)).
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to private companies." 6 If sufficiently widespread, global electronic
currencies could have the same effect.
So far, the Fed has taken a "wait and see" attitude towards the asyet-uncertain impact of stored-value cards on seigniorage, suggesting
only that Congress should monitor the situation."7 The impact of global
electronic currencies, which have yet to be invented and implemented,
is even more speculative, rendering any predictions about government
reaction premature. Ultimately, however, the United States - or any
other government - may find that the best defense against loss of
seigniorage is to maintain the stability, and thus the marketability, of its
own currency.
F. Should Government Regulate GlobalElectronic Currencies?
Suppose the United States and other nations accept the argument
that global electronic currencies would benefit Internet commerce
without seriously undermining government power, and thus they allow
such currencies to exist. Then, another question still remains to be
answered: To what extent, and in what ways, should government
regulate companies that issue global electronic currencies?
The Clinton-Gore report raised this question without resolving it.
As already noted above, the report acknowledged that, given rapid
changes in the commercial and technological environment, it would be
difficult to develop timely and appropriate policy. Thus, the report
eschewed inflexible regulation in favor of case-by-case monitoring of
electronic payment experiments. "' In the long run, however, the report
questioned whether marketplace and industry self-regulation would be
adequate: "[G]ovenment action may be necessary to ensure the safety
and soundness of electronic payment systems, to protect consumers, or
to respond to important law enforcement objectives.""' 9
This Article does not attempt to address every possible regulatory
issue raised by electronic currencies in general. 2 '

116. Seeid.
117. See id.
118. See Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 1, at "Electronic Payment

Systems."
119. Id.
120. For example, the topic of how electronic payment systems could be used to

launder money, and how regulations might respond, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Government officials in the United States and elsewhere are worried that stored-value
cards, digital cash, and other electronic payment systems could make it easier for

criminals to evade money laundering controls. See Next, Cyberlaundering?,
ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 21. The Financial Action Task Force on Money
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Laundering ("FATF"), which has 26 nations as members, has already begun to study the
possible impact of electronic payment systems on money laundering. See FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, 1997-1998 REPORT ON MONEY
LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES,

pt. 11(ii),
New Payment Technologies (Feb. 12, 1998)

<http:l/www.ustreas.gov/fincen/typo97en.html> [hereinafter FATF REPORT].
In theory, any electronic payment system could make it harder to detect and punish
money laundering. Unlike bulky paper money, electrons are easy to store, hide, and
send from one country to another. See Next, Cyberlaundering?,supra. In addition,
electronic payment systems that are anonymous (Digicash), or that permit users to
transfer value directly to other users (Mondex), could erode the audit trail. See, e.g.,
ProliferatingCyberbanks Threaten Money LaunderingControls, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, May 1997, at 8.
The global electronic currencies proposed in this Article would be designed to
circulate from user to user. Thus, they could present some of the same challenges for
law enforcement as other electronic payment systems. However, global electronic
currencies would not pose a unique money laundering threat, simply because they were
privately issued, managed, and denominated.
Although some commentators have suggested that criminal enterprises would issue
their own brands of electronic currencies, see Duncan Goldie-Scot & Elizabeth Sowton,
Outlookfor Cyberlaundering,VIRTUAL FIN. REP., June 1, 1997, at 10, this prospect
seems unrealistic. After all, the entire purpose of money laundering is to conceal - not
advertise - the criminal origin of these funds. Criminals could best avoid suspicion by
using electronic payment systems denominated in existing currencies. Dollars would
raise fewer eyebrows than hayeks for many years to come.
Moreover, global electronic currencies would create opportunities, as well as
challenges, for law enforcement. Just as dollar bills are a paper form of cash, the hayek
would be an electronic form of cash. As it became more popular and widespread,
individuals who owned large amounts of the currency would seek out safe places to store
and invest their cash. Responding to demand, banks might begin to offer interestbearing accounts denominated in hayeks. Once this system was established, large
deposits ofhayeks would raise red flags for banks and regulators. Similarly, people who
purchased cars, homes, or other big-ticket items with hayeks, rather than initiating a fund
transfer from a bank account, would draw the attention of merchants and regulators.
It is difficult to predict how law enforcement might react to the emergence ofglobal
electronic currencies. For now, however, one warning is appropriate. Last year, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of Treasury
proposed regulations that would impose extensive money laundering controls on banks
and other companies that offer stored-value products and electronic payment systems.
See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Proposed Amendment to the Bank Secrecy
Act Regulations - Definition and Registration of Money Services Businesses, 62 Fed.
Reg. 27,890 (1997) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103) (proposed May 21, 1997);
Thomas E. Crocker, Selected Regulatory Developments; ProposedRegulationsApply
Bank Secrecy Act to Electronic Banking and Commerce, ELECTRONIC BANKING L. &
COM. REP., June 1997, at 25. This proposal is inconsistent with the "hands off"approach
that the Clinton administration has adopted in order to encourage development of
electronic payment systems. See Crocker, supra, at 26. Given that no case of
"cyberlaundering" has yet been detected, see FATF REPORT, supra, at 7, the rush to
regulate electronic payment technologies seems particularly surprising.
At the time this Article went to press, it was unclear whether the Treasury would
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However, this Article focuses on one particularly serious challenge to its
specific thesis that private companies should be allowed to issue,
denominate, and manage their own currencies. Specifically, would and should - issuance of global electronic currencies be considered

"banking"? The answer to this question is critical; if "yes," myriad
federal and state banking laws and regulations could make it very
difficult, or even impossible, for Free Market and its competitors to enter
the marketplace.
1. What Is Banking?

Modem banking has come to be defined primarily by two types of
activity: accepting demand deposits, and making commercial loans.'

The issuer of a global electronic currency need not be involved in either
of these activities. To illustrate, reconsider the Free Market hypothetical.

Initially, Free Market would issue the hayek - a digital note - to users
in exchange for value equivalent to a specified percentage of a

commodity basket. Once established, the hayek would be provided at
the prevailing exchange rate. Users could pay for hayeks with dollars,
securities, or any other form of value acceptable to Free Market.

Under this scenario, Free Market would not be making a commercial
loan to users; rather, as the holders of digital notes, users would be

promulgate final regulations, and if so, what the content of those regulations would be.
Thus, before issuing private electronic currencies, companies should investigate the
status of these and other money laundering regulations that might apply to their projects.
For an overview of further regulatory issues that electronic payment systems pose,
see Oedel, supra note 50.
121. See Henry H. Perritt, Legal and TechnologicalInfrastructuresfor Electronic
Payment Systems, 22 RTYrGERS COMPUTER &TECH. L.J. 1, 34 (1996); see also EDWARD
L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 3 (3d ed. 1991) (explaining that
deposits and loans are at the core of banking).
The following definition from the Bank Holding Company Act is representative:
[T]he term "bank" means any of the following:
(A) An insured bank as defined in section 3h of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. 1813(h)].
(B) An institution organized under the laws of the United States, any State
of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of the United
States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands
which both -

(i)

accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or
others; and
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (1994).
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making a loan to Free Market.'22 Nor would Free Market be in the
business of receiving demand deposits.' 2 As a general rule, demand
deposits are represented by individual accounts with a determinate value
that is carefully adjusted as further deposits and withdrawals are made.
Customers draw upon these accounts using checks, ATM cards,
passbooks, or other similar devices. By contrast, although Free Market
would receive payments in exchange for hayeks, it would not maintain
those payments in "accounts" belonging to individual users. 24
' Doing so
would be pointless, since there would be no expectation that users would
be writing checks or otherwise making withdrawals against such
accounts. Rather, users would be purchasing a currency designed to
circulate from person to person indefinitely, without necessarily coming
back to Free Market for redemption or exchange. Nor would users
acquire the contractual obligation of Free Market to repay a fixed sum.
Presumably, Free Market would be available to exchange hayeks, but at
a rate that would change along with the fortunes of the currency. Even
if Free Market agreed to redeem hayeks at a specified purchase value,25
this would establish not a fixed sum, but rather only a minimum sum.1
Ironically, Free Market's business probably would have been
recognized as banking during the nineteenth century, when state and
national banks issued their own notes to circulate as currency. In 1872,
the United States Supreme Court described banking this way:
Originally the business of banking consisted only in
receiving deposits, such as bullion, plate and the like

122. See Oedel, supra note 50, at 1089 (explaining that money is a loan from holder
to issuer).
123. Thus, Free Market would not violate section 21(a)(2) of the Glass-Steagall Act

of 1933, which prohibits the receipt ofdeposits subject to check or repayment unless one
is licensed or regulated under state or federal banking laws. See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2)

(1994); Task Force on Stored-Value Cards, supra note 5, at 676.
124. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, General Counsel's Opinion No. 8;
Stored Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,490, 40,492-93 (1996) (when stored-value card
represents funds that have been withdrawn from customer account and maintained in
bank reserve account, that reserve account is not a "deposit" within the meaning of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act). But see WORKING GROUP ON EU PAYMENT SYSTEMS,
EUR. MONETARY INST., REPORT TO COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE

ON PREPAID CARDS (1994) (noting that balances on multi-purpose stored-value cards
represent funding that is equivalent, in economic terms, to deposit-taking; thus, only
credit institutions should be allowed to issue such cards).

125. These two characteristics of currency - indefinite circulation and variable
value - distinguish the hayek and other global electronic currencies from stored-value
products, such as traveler's checks and stored-value cards, which are intended for
prompt redemption at the stated sum.
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for safe-keeping until the depositor should see fit to
draw it out for use, but the business, in the progress of
events, was extended, and bankers assumed to discount
bills and notes and to loan money upon mortgage,
pawn, or other security, and at a still laterperiod to
issue notes of their own intended as a circulating
currency and a medium of exchange instead ofgold
and silver. Modem bankers frequently exercise any
two or even all three of those functions, but it is still
true that an institution prohibited from exercising any
more than one of those functions is a bank in the
strictest commercial sense .... 12 6
Similarly, the National Bank Act, enacted in 1863 and still in force
today, provides that a national banking association can exercise powers
necessary to carry on the business of banking, including "obtaining,
issuing, and circulating notes."'127 However, since 1935, when the last
national bank notes were retired from circulation and currency became
a monopoly of the Federal Reserve System,128 the business of
banking
2 9
no longer has included the issuance and circulation of notes.
In sum, despite its treatment during the nineteenth century as an
ordinary bank function, currency issuance falls outside the boundaries
of banking as it is presently conceived. This is not because there is an
economic distinction between notes and deposits (which are alternative
forms of bank liabilities),13 but rather because currency issuance has
become a government monopoly. Given that the present regulatory
structure was not designed with private currency in mind, the blind
application of that entire structure to global electronic currencies would
be unworkable and perhaps even impossible.
0

126.
added).
127.
128.
129.

Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 109, 118-19 (1872) (emphasis
12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1994).
See Solomon, supranote 20, at 64.
Several sections of the United States Code were once devoted to the issuance,

redemption, and replacement of circulating bank notes. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 101-138
(1988). These provisions have been either repealed as obsolete or amended. See Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103325, § 602(e)-(g), 108 Stat. 2160, 2291-94.

130. See WHITE, supranote 20, at 82.

HeinOnline -- 11 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 772 1997-1998

No. 3]

Private Currencieson the Internet

2. Preventing Runs and Panics
Even if Free Market and other issuers of global electronic currencies
would not be engaged in banking as such, two questions remain: would
the issuance of such currencies raise the same policy concerns as
banking; and, if so, would some form of government regulation be the
best way of addressing those concerns?
One commonly asserted reason for regulating banks is to prevent
runs and panics. 3 ' According to the classic account of such events,
when depositors lose faith in the solvency of one particular bank, a
trickle of withdrawals quickly becomes a flood and causes the bank to
close once its immediate supply of currency runs out. This closure, in
turn, generates enough free-floating financial anxiety to cause a fullfledged panic, as depositors stampede other banks for no reason. 2
Ultimately, if the withdrawals become heavy enough, bank solvency can
be threatened, and the savings of depositors jeopardized. 33 In addition,
widespread bank failures can disrupt the money supply, 134 and cause the
check clearing system (which is managed by banks) to malfunction. 3
Over the years, banking laws and regulations have developed
several defenses against runs and panics. For example, the policy of
preventing bank failures plays a significant role in the granting of bank
charters. 36 Before the Comptroller of the Currency exercises his
discretion to grant a federal bank charter, he must consider several
factors, including many that are relevant to solvency, such as the future
earnings, capital structure, management, and financial history and
condition of the proposed bank. 137 Federal deposit insurance minimizes
the possibility of runs and panics by reassuring depositors that their
money is safe even if their banks go under. 3 And, should a run occur
nevertheless, federal regulation seeks to minimize its impactby requiring

131. See Oedel, supranote 50, at 1083.
132. For an account of the bank run and panic phenomenon, see JONATHAN R.
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION

47-49 (1992).

133. See id. at 47.
134. See id. at 52-53. Some economists believe that the Great Depression was
triggered when a breakdown of the banking system caused a sudden contraction in the
money supply, as depositors withdrew funds from banks. See id.
135. See id. at 54-55. Again, an illustration from the Great Depression Era is
instructive. A panic resulted in suspension of the payments system for about a week
during the so-called "bank holiday" of 1933. See id.
136. See SYMONS & WHITE, supranote 121, at 72.
137. See 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1994); SYMONS & WHITE, supranote 121, at 72.
138. See Oedel, supranote 50, at 1084.
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a bank to maintain a specified percentage of its transaction accounts in
39
reserves.1

Global electronic currencies could raise some of these policy
concerns, but to a lesser extent. For example, suppose that rumors began
to fly that Free Market was experiencing financial difficulty. Then,
users might begin to demand that hayeks be exchanged or redeemed at
the guaranteed minimum value. If Free Market did not have enough
liquid assets to meet these demands, it might be forced into
insolvency. 4 ° However, this single run on a single company need not

trigger a panic. The hayek would be an independently issued, managed,
and denominated currency, unlike any other, and exist outside the
traditional network of government currencies and banks. Holders of
competing private and government currencies would have no reason to
believe that Free Market's financial problems spelled trouble for other,
independent companies or the financial system in general. (In particular,
depositors would have every reason to remain confident in their federally
insured dollar deposits.)
Nevertheless, lawmakers and regulators unfamiliar with global
electronic currencies could respond by passing new laws that would
subject Free Market and other issuers to banking laws and regulations,
14

such as regulatory supervision, reserve requirements, and insurance.'
142

Unfortunately, this response would restrict issuance to banks.
Alternatively, lawmakers and regulators could enact laws or
promulgate regulations modeled after state laws governing traveler's
checks and money transmitters. For example, states that license
American Express to issue traveler's checks have required it to back one

139. See id. at 1083. Reserve requirements are presently set between 8 and 14 % of
transaction accounts. See id. "Reserves" are composed of currency and deposits in
Federal Reserve Banks. See Solomon, supranote 20, at 65.
140. The real problem for Free Market would not be that redemption demands were
greater than immediately available reserves. Rather, Free Market would be seriously
threatened if its assets could not be liquidated, were less than liabilities, or had a market
value that fell during the run. See DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM 221

(2d ed. 1989).
141. See Oedel, supra note 50, at 1095.
142. See Smith & Wilson, supra note 6, at 1114. Banks are enthusiastic about this
prospective outcome. In September 1996, the American Bankers Association Payments
System Task Force released a report recommending that "only regulated depository
institutions have direct access to the Federal Reserve's payment services, and issuance
of third-party instruments [such as stored-value cards] should be limited to regulated
depository institutions." Joseph Radigan, Locking Up: The Money Monopoly, U.S.
BANKER, Jan. 1997, at 26.
Another author has advocated a more radical solution: only the federal government
should issue electronic cash. See Konvisser, supra note 51, at 333.
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hundred percent of outstanding check value with liquid instruments such
as cash, Treasury bonds, or AAA-rated corporate debt.'43 Similarly,
money transmitters, such as Western Union, are often required to: (1)
maintain reserves; (2) make only authorized investments; (3) file annual
reports and submit to audits; (4) meet owner and operator qualifications;
and (5) post bonds.'"
Before lawmakers and regulators leap into this apparent breach,
however, it is worth considering whether the market might supply
similar protections on its own. As explained more thoroughly above in
Part C, issuers of global electronic currencies would have no chance of
attracting business in the first place unless they took steps to ensure user
confidence. Maintaining enough liquid assets to meet redemption
demands, 4 ' establishing a reputation for trustworthiness, 4 6 and

advertising' 47 could help to break the dreaded chain of anxiety, runs,
insolvency, and customer loss. Voluntary purchase of private insurance
could also go a long way towards reassuring and protecting users of
global electronic currencies.
Moreover, there are several excellent reasons to favor market, rather
than regulatory, solutions at this time. First, as the Clinton-Gore report
acknowledged, oppressive and inflexible regulations could prove
harmful to the development of electronic payment systems.14 Existing
laws and regulations were developed for payment devices based on the
dollar and other official monies. By contrast, global electronic
currencies would be issued, managed, and denominated independently
of official monies. Blind application of existing laws or regulations to
such novel and unique currencies could stunt, or even kill, their
development. Even laws or regulations designed specifically for global
143. See Radigan, supra note 142.
144. See TASK FORCE ON STORED VALUE CARDS, supra note 5, at 676; Smith &
Wilson, supra note 6, at 1114-15. The scope of these laws may sometimes be broad
enough to cover global electronic currencies, even without any deliberate legislative
extension. For a discussion of representative state statutes, see Smith & Wilson, supra
note 6, at 1114 n.50; Money Transmitters and Check-Sellers: A State-by-State Survey,
ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COM. REP., July-Aug. 1997, at 10.
145. See G-10 REPORT, supra note 10, at 19 (asserting that market incentives will
motivate issuers to develop effective financial risk management practices, including
maintaining liquid assets to meet redemption demands).
146. See supra Part I.C.4.
147. See supra Part I.C.1.
148. See Global Electronic Commerce, supra note 1, at "Electronic Payment
Systems." This concern seems to be borne out by recent reports that banks - which are
heavily regulated - have gotten off to a slow start in developing electronic payment
systems and may be shut out of the market unless they act soon. See, e.g., Carol Power,
Internet Warning: It's Getting Late in the Game, AM. BANKER, June 17, 1997, at 22.
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electronic currencies could be damaging if enacted before the market had
the chance to search out the most efficient solutions to the risks posed
above.
Second, as the Clinton-Gore report noted, any legal framework for
commercial transactions on the Internet should be governed by
consistent principles across state, national, and international borders.'49
Premature imposition ofregulatory controls by one financially powerful
nation, like the United States, could encourage other nations to follow
suit, generating a patchwork of legal requirements that no company
could meet. 50 If this occurred, "global" electronic currencies would
never become a reality. Unlike national governments, however, the
Intemet marketplace has a global reach and scope. Consequently, the
marketplace itself is most likely to generate the consistent practices that
are necessary to protect users while allowing a worldwide currency to
function properly.
Third, hasty enactment or application of laws and regulations is
unnecessary because global electronic currencies would not pose a
significant threat to either users or the economy in the near future.
Currencies designed specifically for use on the Internet would represent
only a small fraction of the entire money supply - particularly in their
infancy. Users could suffer occasional losses if companies produced
currencies that malfunctioned, became unstable, or could not be
redeemed due to insolvency; however, users could seek redress through
insurance, breach of contract actions, or claims in bankruptcy actions.
Similarly, because global electronic currencies would be used only on
the Internet, the impact of runs or insolvencies on the economy as a
whole wouldbe minimized. Thus, governments could afford to monitor
the progress of these currencies and determine whether the market was
providing adequate solutions on its own to safety and soundness
5
concerns.1 1

149. See GlobalElectronic Commerce, supra note 1, at "Principles."
150. 1 recognize that companies faced with burdensome laws and regulations often
locate their operations in countries with a more accommodating attitude. However,
given the global nature of the cybermarket, such "regulatory flight" might not provide
a complete solution for electronic currency issuers. For example, even if Free Market
issued hayeks from its corporate headquarters in the Cayman Islands, its currency would
be received by people located in countries all over the world, who could be harmed if
Free Market inflated its currency or became insolvent. It would not be surprising if
those other countries took a strong interest in Free Market's operations - perhaps even
passing laws to block the use of hayeks unless Free Market satisfied local safety and
soundness standards.
151. Reports from American and international organizations have recognized that

electronic currencies do not presently pose a serious threat to the economic order.
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In the meantime, there is an important step that the United States
could take to encourage the development of global electronic currencies.
As mentioned above, one of the greatest threats to the emergence of
global electronic currencies would be a patchwork of inconsistent legal
requirements. To clean up this patchwork, legislators could enact
legislation to repeal outdated laws while administrators could issue
opinions to clarify the scope of remaining laws and regulations. For
example, as explained above in Subpart E, the United States enacted
several statutes during the Civil War Era that prohibited private issuance
of currencies. Although companies can probably structure electronic
currencies to avoid these laws, these laws have outlived their original
purposes' 52 and should be repealed. At the same time, Congress could
enact legislation to preempt similar state laws that prohibit private
currency issuance.' 53 Meanwhile, the Fed, FDIC, and like agencies

For example, the G-1O Report concludes: "[I]n the short term, there is no prospect
of electronic money giving rise to systemic risk. Existing schemes are too small, both
in terms of the total amounts outstanding, and the amounts held by individual users, for
a failure to have contagion effects." G-10 REPORT, supra note 10, at 20-21.
Similarly, the FDIC recently announced that it would not propose regulations or
seek legislation to define stored-value cards as deposits for purposes of insurance
coverage. See Ellen d'Alelio, Selected Regulatory Developments July 1997; FDIC
Statement re RegulationsandLegislation AddressingStored-Value Cards,ELECTRONIC
BANKING L. &CoM. REP., July-Aug. 1997, at 16. In support of this decision, the FDIC
reasoned that, because stored-value cards were presently being issued only to a small
portion of the banking public, collapse of any one card system would not seriously
threaten a card-issuing bank or the banking system as a whole. See id. For a look at the
FDIC announcement, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Will Continue
to Rely on General Counsel Opinion Rather than Issue Rules on Stored-Value Cards
(June 24, 1997) <http://www.fdie.gov/publish/newprs/pr9744.html>.
152. For example, the Civil War Era statute with the broadest application was enacted
to secure a monopoly for an experimental national postage currency. See supra note 102
and accompanying text.
153. Consider, for example, the following California statute:
Issuing or Circulating Paper Money. Every person who
makes, issues, or puts in circulation any bill, check, ticket,
certificate, promissory note, or the paper of any bank, to circulate
as money, except as authorized by the laws of the United States, for
the first offense is guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each and every
subsequent offense, is guilty of felony.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 648 (Deering 1997). This ancient statute, enacted in 1872, has
received littlejudicial attention. See, e.g., People v. Burkett, 74 Cal. Rptr. 692 (Ct. App.
1969) (holding that counterfeiting dollar bills does not constitute issuing or circulating
paper money). Although the statute is otherwise broadly worded, the introductory
language seems to limit its scope to paper money. Nevertheless, a company that
marketed electronic currency could breathe easier if statutes like this one were stricken
from the books.
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could be encouraged to issue opinions recognizing that issuance of
global electronic currencies would not constitute "banking" subject to
existing laws and regulations. Other nations could be encouraged to take
similar legislative and executive action to eliminate impediments to the
cross-border use of global electronic currencies. 4
Of course, the process of weeding out obsolete or irrelevant laws
one by one would take time. Congress could achieve a swifter solution
by enacting legislation specifically authorizing private companies to
issue global electronic currencies. Such legislation could: (1) preempt
any federal or state laws that would otherwise prohibit the issuance of
global electronic currencies; (2) clarify that banking laws and regulations
do not apply to the issuance of global electronic currencies; and (3)
override state money transmitter laws that might otherwise impose
inconsistent requirements on issuers of global electronic currencies. 5To ensure that the infant industry learned from experience, Congress
could also authorize a federal agency to monitor it for a set number of
years and report on its progress. If these observations gave rise to safety
and soundness concerns, Congress could then consider implementing
appropriate legislative or regulatory controls.
Ultimately, this laissez-faire program should be extended beyond the
United States to other nations. Conventions or model laws could
provide the vehicles necessary to obtain worldwide authorization for the
issuance and use of global electronic currencies. If the United States
government is serious about encouraging global electronic commerce,
it should exercise its influence with the rest of the international
community to get legal projects like these started now.
II. COMMUNITY ELECTRONIC CURRENCIES

Thus far, this Article has considered private electronic currencies
that would facilitate global commerce on the Internet. This focus was
consistent with the Clinton-Gore report, which asserted ISthe
need to
6
facilitate global commerce as one of five basic principles.

154. Cf G-10 REPORT, supranote 10, at 29 (stating that, given range of policies that
have emerged in G-10 countries, governments must consider how to minimize
impediments to the cross-border use of, or competition in the provision of, electronic
money).
155. Although not designed with global electronic currencies in mind, some money
transmitter laws may have been drafted broadly enough to bring such currencies within
their scope. See supra note 144.
156. See GlobalElectronic Commerce, supra note 1, at "Principles."
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Yet, to stop here would leave the full potential of the Internet
unrealized. As the Clinton-Gore report recognized in another one of its
basic principles, governments should recognize the unique qualities of
the Internet, including its decentralized nature and "tradition of bottomup governance."'

7

One of these unique qualities is that individuals are freed from the
constraints of physical space and can exercise their liberty to form new
and diverse communities in cyberspace. Recognizing this fact, Part II
devises a model for community electronic currencies- that is, private
electronic currencies designed to circulate only within specific Internet
communities. Part II explains how community electronic currencies
would strengthen Internet communities and thereby facilitate electronic
commerce in a manner consistent with, if not anticipated by, the ClintonGore agenda.
A. Internet Communities
As a global communications network, the Internet allows individuals
to associate freely across geographical and national boundaries.' 58 As a
result, proto-communities have already begun to form in cyberspace.
Professor David Friedman has noted the widespread formation of mailgroups. 59 Individuals who want to discuss a particular topic establish a
group e-mail address and a list of members. E-mail messages to the
group address are then relayed to everyone on the list. In effect, the
mail-group is a privately evolved association, with limited objectives and
voluntary membership."" Within a few decades, Friedman has
predicted, the necessary technology will exist to support "virtual"

157. Id.
158. Two Internet scholar. have observed:
Cyberspace has no territorially based boundaries, because the cost
and speed of message transmission on the Net is almost entirely
independent of physical location. Messages can be transmitted
from one physical location to any other location without
degradation, decay, or substantial delay, and without any physical
cues or barriers that might otherwise keep certain geographically
remote places and people separate from another.
Johnson & Post, supra note 76, at 1370-71.
159. David Friedman, A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and Perils of
Encryption, SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Summer 1996, at 212, 222-23.
160. See id. To stay on the list, members mhst observe rules, such as sticking to the
topic of discussion and observing a certain level of courtesy. Violators are eliminated
from the list. If the rules are unsatisfactory, malcontents can leave and start a new mailgroup. See id.
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communities. '6' Members will be able to hear, see, and interact with
each other in "virtual" rooms.' 62 According to Friedman, "[e]ach
[virtual] community will have its own rules, enforced by a single
sanction: expulsion. The 63result will be a world defined by a single rule:
1
freedom of association."
Within such Internet communities, ideas would reign supreme.
Nicknames, voices, and images would make anonymous encounters
possible, 164 allowing individuals to associate without regard to
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, or
disability. Some communities would be organized around shared
avocations; more significantly, others would emphasize common
political, philosophical, scientific, artistic, and moral values.
Of course, the fact that the Internet tends to encourage the formation
of communities does not necessarily provide a normative justification for
such communities. However, such justification can be found in political

theory.
As explained above, Professors Johnson and Post have argued
persuasively that the Internet constitutes its own place - a place that
transcends territorial boundaries. 65 At present, this place is not only
unique, but also very new - an unregulated, virgin territory akin to a
state of nature. As John Locke argued, individuals in a state of nature
have the "freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions

161. See id. at 223. More specifically, the requisite technology is Internet channels
of sufficient bandwidth to provide real-time audio-video to most users. See id. at 216.
162. See id. at 223. Friedman has offered the following description of a virtual
meeting:
The year is 2010. From the viewpoint of an observer, I am alone
in my office, wearing goggles and earphones. From my viewpoint,
I am at a table in a conference room with a dozen other people.
The other people are real - seated in offices scattered around the
world. The table and the room exist only in the mind of a
computer. The scene is being drawn, at a rate of sixty frames a
second, on my goggles - a little differently for each eye, to give
three-dimensional vision. The meeting is virtual, but, to my sight
and hearing, it might as well be real.
Id. at 216-17.
163. Id. at 223. Similarly, Professors Johnson and Post have suggested that
cyberspace may promote "new connections between individuals" and new mechanisms
of self-governance by which individuals attain a sense of community. Johnson & Post,
supranote 76, at 1397.
164. E-mail aliases and nicknames are already common. If and when "virtual"
encounters become possible, the technology could be designed so that users could
present whatever voice or image they wish.
165. See Johnson & Post, supranote 76, at 1370-71, 1378-79.
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and persons, as they think fit,"' 66 so long as they do not harm the lives,
health, liberty, or possessions of others. 67 Locke predicted that,
although each individual has the right to enforce the law of nature
herself,' the difficulty of doing so69 would cause her to abandon the
state of nature and unite in society with others to protect "their lives,
liberties and estates."' 70
Modem political theorists have given these basic premises a more
current expression. Most notably, in Anarchy, State and Utopia,77'

Robert Nozick set forth a natural law theory of the rise of the state.

1

He theorized that individuals in a state of nature would exercise their
liberty to form voluntary protective associations. 73 Over time, some of
these associations would become dominant within particular geographic

areas. These dominant protective associations would enjoy a nearmonopoly174 over the use of force 17' and would have a moral obligation

166. JOHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 4, at 8 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., 1980) (1690) (emphasis omitted).
167. Seeid. §6, at9.
168. See id. § 7, at 9; see also § 8, at 10.
169. An individual might render ajudgment in favor ofherselfthat was biased or that
imposed disproportionate punishment. See id. §§ 124-125, at 66. Moreover, even a
proper judgment might be difficult or dangerous to enforce against others. See id. § 126,
at 66.
170. Id. § 123, at 66.
171. ROBERTNOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) [hereinafter NOZiCK,
ANARCHY].

Recently, Nozick has suggested that the political philosophy presented in Anarchy
failed to address the importance of political action as a symbolic expression of our social
ties and concerns. See ROBERT NOZiCK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-92 (1989); ROBERT

NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 32 (1993). However, his self-critique is not
intended as an alternative theory to the one presented in Anarchy. See NOZICK, THE
EXAMINED LIFE, supra, at 287. Because I find Nozick's original work to be logical,
persuasive, and illuminating, I feel that its use here is justified.
172. Nozick acknowledged his reliance upon Locke in the opening chapter of his
book. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supranote 171, at 9.
173. These protective associations would apprehend, punish, and assess
compensation against wrongdoers, both within and outside the association. See id. at
13-15.
174. According to Nozick, independents - thosd who did not join a protective
association - could administer their own procedures of justice, adjudicating and
exacting punishment for violations of their rights. See id. at 22-24. However, the
dominantproteti ve association legitimately could extend its powerby defending its own
clients against the unreliable or unknown procedures of independents. See id. at 88,
101-02.

Nozick acknowledged that the dominant protective association's control over the
use of force would not be absolute - if one independent enforced justice against
another, and both were satisfied with the procedure employed, the association would
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to protect everyone living within their boundaries.' 76 Thus, "[o]ut of

anarchy, pressed by spontaneous

groupings, mutual-protection

associations, division of labor, market pressures, economies of scale, and
rational self-interest there arises something very much resembling77a
minimal state or a group of geographically distinct minimal states."'
Going beyond this basic political model, Nozick also speculated as
to the nature of utopia, that is, the best of all possible worlds. 17 He
began with the premise that people "differ in temperament, interests,
intellectual ability, aspirations, natural bent, spiritual quests, and the kind
of life they wish to lead.' '179 Because people are so different, Nozick
reasoned, no single lifestyle is objectively best for everyone.S0 Thus, he

concluded, "[u]topia is aframework for utopias, a place where people
are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize
their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no
one can impose his own utopian vision upon others.''. This framework

have no right to intervene. However, he argued, the dominant protective association
could still be a state, since citizens could opt out of a state's judicial apparatus. See id.
at 110.
175. See id. at 109. Nozick argued that monopoly over the use of force (except that
necessary in self-defense) was a defining characteristic of the state. See id. at 26; see
also LOCK.8, supra note 166, § 87, at 46 (identifying a monopoly over the use of force
as a key attribute of the state).
176. The reasoning underlying this conclusion is complex. As explained, a dominant
protective association would prohibit independents from enforcing unreliable or
unknown procedures ofjustice, leaving them vulnerable to harm. See supra note 174.
This would be unfair, since some independents could have carried out their own brand
of justice without violating anyone's rights. Thus, Nozick reasoned, the dominant
protective association would have a moral obligation to compensate independents for
their disadvantages by, for example, supplying them with protective services against its
own members. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 171, at 110; see also id. at 78-87
(deriving the "principle of compensation" underlying this conclusion). When an
independent could not afford such services, the protective association would have to
make up the difference between the monetary costs of independent enforcement and the
cost of an adequate protective policy. See id. at I11.
177. NoZiCK, ANARCHY, supra note 17 1, at 16-17. Nozick defined the minimal state
as the "night-watchman state of classical liberal theory, limited to the functions of
protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of
contracts." Id. at 26. He reasoned that a dominant protective association would qualify
as a minimal state if it had both a monopoly on force and an obligation to compensate
those within its borders for depriving them of the power to use force on their own
initiative. See id. at 118-19.
178. See id. at 298.
179. Id. at309.
180. Seeid. at310.
181. Id. at 312 (first emphasis added).
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was equivalent to the minimal state described above.'

Within it, a wide

variety of utopian communities could "[grow] spontaneously from the
individual choices of many people over a long period of time."' 83
The foregoing political theory offers a normative rationale for the
rise of Internet communities. Individuals exercising their "perfect
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit,"' 4 could choose to come together in Intemet
communities for purposes of pursuing their political, philosophical,
economic, artistic, scientific, and moral values. Because liberty offers
a content-neutral framework for community building, individual choice
should build a wide variety of communities on the Internet over time.
However, no matter how wide the differences, each and every
community could be characterized as the product of individual freedom.
This would be particularly true given that members could not only join,
but also exit, the community at will. 5
B. StrongPrivacy
What features would be necessary to allow Internet communities to
come into existence, thrive, and grow beyond their limited origin as
mail-groups? Professor Friedman has argued that encryption 8 6 is the

182. See id. at 333.
183. Id. at 332. Nozick declined to describe or prescribe the character of particular
utopian communities within society. The nature of such communities was important, he
acknowledged - so important that it should not be prescribed by anyone (not even
himself) for anyone else. See id. at 329.
184. See LoCKE, supra note 166, § 4, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
185. Compare the following argument in support of allowing cyberspace to evolve
its own legal rules:
[TI]he ease with which individuals can move between different rule
sets in Cyberspace has important implications for any contractarian
political philosophy deriving a justification of the State's exercise
of coercive power over its citizens from their consent to the
exercise of that power. In the nonvirtual world, this consent has a
strong fictional element.... In Cyberspace, though, any given
user has a more accessible exit option, in terms of moving from
one virtual environment's rule set to another's, thus providing a
more legitimate "selection mechanism" by which differing rule sets
will evolve over time.
Johnson & Post, supranote 76, at 1398 (citations omitted).
186. Cryptography has been defined as "the art of creating and using methods of
disguising messages, using codes, ciphers, and other methods, so that only certain people
can see the real message." A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key:
Cryptography,the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 713
(1995). Encryption takes place when a person takes an original message, or "plaintext,"
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key to establishing and maintaining Internet communities. Encryption

not only keeps the content of messages private, but also allows
individuals to make anonymous cash payments to each other over the
Internet.1s7 Encryption also makes it possible to operate anonymous
8
remailers,"'

which prevent interlopers from learning the ultimate

destination of intercepted messages." 9 With defensive technologies like
these, a world of "strong privacy" can be created in which individuals
can establish and maintain Internet communities without suffering

and uses cryptography to generate a disguised message, or "ciphertext." See id. at 714.
Decryption converts ciphertext into plaintext. See id.
Two basic systems of cryptography are popular today. The most widespread
method encrypts plaintext with a secret key to create ciphertext. The same secret key
must be used to decrypt the ciphertext and restore the original texL See Antony Watts,
Cryptography Is Key to Securing ProprietaryInformation, EDN, July 6, 1995, at 99,
available in LEXIS, News Library. Security turns on the complexity of the data
involved; in theory, the most powerful computers available in 1995 would take more
than 100 years to identify the secret key. See id.
A more recent innovation is public key cryptography, which uses two keys: one
for encryption, and another for decryption. Suppose, for example, that Mary wants to
send a message to John. She finds his public key in a directory and uses it to encrypt her
message. To decrypt the message, John applies his private key known only to him. See
id.; Friedman, supranote 159, at 215. Public key cryptography also makes it possible
to send signed messages. Returning to the example, suppose Mary wants John to know
that she- and only she- is sending the message. First, she encrypts the plaintext with
her private key known only to her. Then, she encrypts with John's public key and sends
the message to him. To decrypt, John first applies his private key and then applies
Mary's public key (available through a directory). If the message truly comes from
Mary, then John should end up with readable text. See Friedman, supranote 159.
As with secret key cryptography, the security of public key cryptography turns on
its complexity. Supposedly, years of supercomputer resources might be required to
crack the encryption. See John Markoff, A Chink in the DigitalArmor,MIAMI HERALD,
Int'l Ed., Dec. 15,1995, at2B. Recently, however, one researcher has published a paper
detailing a possible method of determining private keys within minutes. See id. Using
electronic eavesdropping devices, a wrongdoer could monitor the process ofdecrypting
incoming messages. By keeping track of the precise length of time it takes to decrypt
each message, the wrongdoer could eventually establish a group of possible keys and
then test them until the correct one was identified. See id.
187. See Friedman, supra note 159, at 217.
188. Friedman has described anonymous remailers this way:
An anonymous remailer is a site on the Internet which receives messages,
each with the address of its destination attached, and then resends them to that
address. An observer sees a thousand messages come into the remailer and
a thousand come out, but even if he knows the source of each incoming
message and the destination of each outgoing one, he does not know which
sender is communicating with which recipient.
Id. at 217-18.
189. See id. at 217-18.
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interference by the government or other individuals.' 90 As Friedman has
stated, "[w]hat cannot be observed cannot be controlled."' 9 '
Whatpossible reason could law-abiding citizens have for employing

strong privacy? Many examples are possible. Support groups for
victims of AIDS, herpes, infertility, or other medical conditions could
use encryption to protect against casual snoopers, vigilantes, personal
enemies, employers, and insurance companies. Less dramatically, even
an Internet church group or sewing circle could use encryption to
discourage private research firms from investigating its purchasing
habits and selling reports, or home phone numbers, to advertisers and
vendors. 92 Finally - and most regrettably - strong privacy might
sometimes be necessary to guard against political oppression. For
example, pro-democracy activists in China or feminists in fundamentalist
Iran could utilize encryption to protect themselves against the
persecution that would follow if their beliefs became known. Even in

America, encryption could provide necessary protection against the
unlawful actions ofour own elected representatives. Consider the recent
revelation that former President Richard M. Nixon plotted to use the
Internal Revenue Service to persecute his political enemies, particularly
those of the Jewish faith.' 93 For individuals who wished to exercise their

190. See id. at 223. Friedman has noted that a world of strong privacy would have
advantages and disadvantages. For example, strong privacy would have the presumably
advantageous consequences of protecting freedom of speech and allowing unlicensed
individuals to provide services to the public. See id.at 219. Inability to observe digitalcash income and expenditures could lead to at least one ambiguous result - the shifting
of taxes from information to goods that could be physically observed, such as food,
housing, and fuel. See id. Perhaps most perniciously, strong privacy would make it
easier to violate copyrights, to deal in trade secrets, to commit blackmail, and to hire
contract killers. See id.
191. Id. at219.
192. In this technological age, privacy advocates have frequently expressed concerns
about the use of computerized information for marketing purposes. For example, smart
cards or other unencrypted electronic payment systems have the potential to create a
record of every purchase an individual makes, enabling market researchers and
advertisers to build profiles of a person's lifestyle and habits. Commentators fear that
individuals could react by altering or censoring their own activities. See, e.g., Catherine
M. Downey, The High Price of a Cashless Society: Exchanging Privacy Rightsfor
DigitalCash?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 303, 305, 322 (1996); Kevin
O'Connor, Smart Cards, Privacy Issues, 5 J.L. & INFO. Sci. 245, 258 (1994); Linda
Shrieves, Cash: Headedfor Extinction;Hey, Buddy, Can You Spare a Credit Card?,
ORLANDO SENTNEL, July 23, 1995, at G1.
193. See George Lardner, Jr., Nixon Sought "Ruthless'Chiefto 'Do What He's Told'
at IRS, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1997, at Al; Barbara J. Saffir, Nixon OrderedProbeof 'Big
Jewish Contributors,'WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1996, at A8; Nixon: 'Go After'Jewish
Contributors, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at A32.
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constitutional rights to free exercise of religion,'94 or freedom of
speech,' 95 encryption could provide protection against illegal
government vendettas as well as the intolerance and hatred of private
persons.
Unfortunately, the future of strong privacy remains an open
question. Worried that encryption will make it harder to identify and
punish criminals, some politicians and law enforcement agencies have
tried to restrict domestic and foreign use of encryption. For years the
Clinton Administration not only has limited export of sophisticated
encryption products,'9 6 but also has floated proposals for voluntary
development and use of encryption subject to key escrow.' 97 In

Possible IRS abuses continue to raise concern. In 1997, Congress opened an
investigation into whether the IRS has targeted conservative nonprofit groups, such as
the Heritage Foundation, for audits. See Congress to Probe Claims IRS Conducts
PoliticallyMotivated Audits, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 1997, at 6. The IRS welcomed the
investigation as an opportunity to clear its name and restore public confidence in its
integrity. See id.
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
195. See id.
196. In November 1996, President Clinton transferred jurisdiction to license
commercial encryption products from the Department of State to the Department of
Commerce. See Thomas E. Crocker, Administration's Key Recovery Policy Presents
Opportunitiesand Challengesto Banks, ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COM. REP., Feb.,
1997, at 6, 7. The Department of Commerce then issued an Interim Rule that added a
new license exception. See 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572 (1996). Under the Rule, companies can
export state-of-the-art encryption software and equipment, so long as their products are
designed to allow recovery of cryptographic function keys, and the keys are escrowed
with key recovery agents acceptable to the Department of Commerce. See Crocker,
supra,at 7-11. These regulations are designed to ensure that law enforcement officials
acting under proper authority can get access to keys. See id. at 7.
197. These proposals have failed miserably. The firstproposal involved development
of an Escrowed Encryption Standard ("EES") that was implemented in the Clipper Chip
(for telephones) and the Capstone Chip (for e-mail, digital signatures, public key
exchange, and random number generation). See Field, supranote 45, at 993; Froomkin,
supra note 186, at 714-16 & n.16. Under this proposal, individuals and companies
could use EES technology; however, in exchange, government agencies would act as
escrow agents, holding keys in case law enforcement needed to break encryption for
surveillance purposes. See Field, supranote 45, at 993; Friedman, supra note 159, at
225-26; Froomkin, supra note 186, at 716. By using the Clipper and Capstone Chips
in its own operations, the government hoped to establish EES technology as a voluntary
standard. See Friedman, supra note 159, at 226; see also Froomkin, supra note 186, at
716 n.20. Although domestic use of other encryption systems was permitted, export
probably would have been blocked. See Field, supranote 45, at 993.
The first Clipper proposal was abandoned in the face of strong public opposition.
A second proposal, which attempted to mollify critics by appointing third-party escrow
agents, also failed. The Clinton administration's third proposal, released in May 1996,
would have permitted export of encryption products up to 64 bits - with escrow. See
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September 1997, the FBI took a tougher line, proposing legislation that
would require domestic encryption products to have a "trapdoor"
feature, so that law enforcement officials wouldhave access to encrypted
communications.198 In opposition, some Senators and Congressmen
have introduced legislation that would liberalize export of encryption
products and prohibit mandatory key escrow.' 99 However, such bills
have not fared well. The best-known of these proposals, the Security
and Freedom Through Encryption Act ("SAFE"),2 0 was gutted in
committee last year.20 '

id. at 993-94.
Despite these failures, the Clinton Administration remains committed to the key
recovery concept. Noting that "[e]ncryption can also be used by criminals and terrorists
to reduce law enforcement capabilities to read their communications," the recent report
on global electronic commerce suggested that"[k]ey recoverybased encryption can help
address some ofthese issues." GlobalElectronicCommerce,supranote 1,at "Security."
198. See John Markoff, White House Wants Control ofHigh-Tech Scrambling,S.F.
EXAMINER, Sept. 7, 1997, at B1. Despite this proposal, the Clinton Administration has
continued to insist that it has no plans to propose mandatory controls on domestic
encryption. See Jeri Clausing, US. Official Says Clinton Wants Market-Driven
Encryption Policy, N.Y. TIMES Oi THE WEB (CyberTimes), Oct. 9, 1997, availablevia
search at <http:l/www.nytimes.com/yr/moldayltechlindexcyber.htrnl>.
199. For a chart listing encryption bills and reporting their progress, see 1997Federal
Legislative InitiativesAffecting ElectronicBanking and Commerce, ELEC. BANKING L.
&CoM. REP., Jan. 1998, at 17-18.
200. H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1997).
201. Although endorsed by the House Judiciary and International Relations
Committees, SAFE foundered in the House National Security Committee, which
amended the bill to give the President and Secretary of Defense continued control over
the export of encryption products. See Jeri Clausing, House Panel Votes to Strengthen
Export Controlson Encryption,N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB (CyberTimes), Sept. 10, 1997,
available via search at <http://www.nytimes.comlyr/mo/day/tecb/lindexcyber.html>.
Worse yet, the House Select Committee on Intelligence amended SAFE to impose the
sort of "trapdoor" desired by the FBI on domestic encryption technology. See Jeri
Clausing, House Committee Casts Wide Net with Encryption Vote, N.Y. TIMES ON THE
WEB (CyberTimes), Sept. 12, 1997, available via search at
<http:l/www.nytimes.comlyr/mo/day/tech/indexeyber.html>. The House Commerce
Committee rejected mandatory key recovery. See Jon Swartz, New Strict Encryption
ControlsRejected, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 1997, at Dl.
The House Rules Committee must determine which of these conflicting versions
Congress may consider. The chairman ofthat committee has indicated that he favors the
key recovery provisions. See Elliot Zaret, House Panel Wants Cops to FindTheir Own
Keys to Encrypted Code, S.F. EXAMrNER, Sept. 25, 1997, at B3.
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C. The Rise of Community Electronic Currencies
Strong privacy would not be the only prerequisite for the healthy
growth of more sophisticated Internet communities. In order to achieve
their highest potential, communities would have to move beyond the
limited world ofdiscussion and develop commerce. Such a development
would seem only natural; after all, individuals who have "perfect
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit,"202 could, and often would, choose to trade
with each other over the Internet.
Because the Internet is an electronic environment, electronic
payment methods would be required to grease the wheels of community
commerce. Thus, payments could be made with stored-value cards, "ecash," or other electronic methods expressed in dollars or other
government monies.
There is, however, a more radical alternative: individuals could
develop, issue, and use private electronic currencies intended to circulate
only within their own communities. Before explaining the benefits of
such individualized currencies, this Article first presents a model.
1. The Basic Model
Local exchange trades schemes ("LETS") are small-scale barter
systems, popular here and abroad. 0 3 In Great Britain, around 20,000
persons have joined 350 LETS.2 These LETS members trade skills and
services with each other, earning and spending points with fanciful
names ("acorns," "bobbins," and so forth) that are often equivalent in
value to pounds sterling.2 s Bartered services range from social services
such as cooking, computing, painting, and haircutting, to professional
services such as lawyering and accounting. 2 6 The mechanics are simple.
For a nominal fee, new participants receive a checkbook that can be used
to pay for services and keep a record of deals. They also get an updated
directory of skills and services that other participants offer. Once

202. LocKE, supra note 166, § 4, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
203. See Victor Keegan, DefyingPilfallsof a CashlessSociety, GUARDIAN, May 30,
1995, at 13 (speculating that an electronic LETS could permit transactions over the

Internet).
204. See Diane Boliver, StrangeCurrencies: Cockles, GroatsandBobbins Take the

Painout ofPaying,SUNDAY MiRRoR, Apr. 30, 1995, at 38.
205. Seeki
206. See id
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written, checks are sent to a treasurer, who sends out regular statements
to participants.2" 7 Trades may be recorded on a central computer.2"'
American communities in thirty-eight states are using similar barter
systems that measure the value of services in time units.209 One popular
system based in New York State uses "Ithaca HOURS," which are
printed as paper notes with watermarks and other features designed to
prevent counterfeiting.210 The use of paper notes, which can be traded
hand-to-hand, eliminates the need to enter transactions into a central
computer.2 ' One Ithaca HOUR is the equivalent often dollars.2 12 A bimonthly newspaper, Ithaca Money, keeps participants informed
by
21 3
publishing advertisements and want ads for goods or services.
How could the LETS experience be translated to the Internet?
Suppose members ofa hypothetical Internet community wanted to barter
information, skills, and services. Goods could also be traded, so long as
members had access to delivery services. As a first step, the community
would establish a private website where members could publish and
search for advertisements and want ads. As a second step, the
community would invent its own electronic currency, or "cyber-unit."
The cyber-unit could be issued and managed in one of two possible
ways. The first method would rely upon a central computer or

bookkeeper. A buyer would send the computer or bookkeeper a digitally
signed214 electronic message identifying herself and ordering payment
of a specified number ofcyber-units to a seller of goods or services. The

207. See id.
208. See David Boyle, New Economics: Moneyfor OldHopes,GUARDIAN, Mar. 22,
1995, at 4.

209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Solomon, supranote 20, at 74.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. Digital signatures work this way. Sender composes a message, then runs it
through a hashing algorithm, creating a message digest. Then, she encrypts the message
digest with her private key, which operates as a signature, and sends both the message
and the signed digest. Recipient runs the message through the same algorithm that
Sender used, creating his own digest. He then uses Sender's public key to decrypt her
digest If the two digests match, then Recipient has verified both that the message is
from Sender, and that no changes were made to the message after it was sent. See Ira H.
Parker, Securing the World of Electronic Banking and Commerce, 1 ELECTRONIC
BANKING L. & CoM. REP., Mar. 1997, at 1, 3.
Use ofdigital signatures would allow the central computer orbookkeeper to verify
both that the payment order was genuine, and that ithad notbeen changed after sending.
In this way, the Internet community could preventwrongdoers from fraudulently issuing
or altering payment orders.
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computer or bookkeeper would debit the buyer, and credit the seller with
cyber-units. The seller could use the resulting units to purchase services
electronically from yet another member of the Internet community.
Meanwhile, to work off her debt, the original buyer would offer services
of her own in exchange for cyber-units. These transactions and records

would be encrypted, or not, at the option of community members." 5
Could members exploit this centralized system by running up
enormous deficits? LETS operating within physical space have not
found a solution to this problem. Interest is not charged on debit
balances, and there are no penalties for being in arrears.21 6 As one LETS
participant stated, "[s]ome people have debts of 1000 Strouds [a private
currency] outstanding. There is nothing much we can do. It is on their
conscience."2'17 However, Internet communities, which are voluntary
associations located in cyberspace, could afford to be stricter. Upon
joining the community, a new member could agree as part of her
contract not to allow her debit balance to exceed a certain amount on
pain of expulsion. Alternatively, the community could limit the deficits
that members were allowed to accrue.
A second method for currency management would mimic the Ithaca
HOURS program. By using paper notes, Ithaca HOURS eliminates
bookkeeping expenses and discourages freeloaders who might otherwise
accrue enormous deficits. Likewise, the Internet community could use
digital promissory "notes" consisting of electronic promises to pay the

215. It must be emphasized that use of the cyber-unit, or any other private Internet
currency, would not exonerate members of the community from responsibility for
income taxes. The Internal Revenue Code defines gross income as "all income from
whatever source derived." 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994). Bartered services are recognized as
a form of gross income. The fair markef value of such services must be included in
income as compensation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1995). When
barter clubs award barter units for performance of services, members must report the
dollar value of those units as income for the tax year in which the units were received.
C.B. Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1, 26. Reasoning by analogy, a community member who
performed services and was paid in private electronic currency would have to report the
dollar value of that currency as income and pay taxes on it.
216. See Boliver, supra note 204, at 38.
217. James Meikle, Stroud: Newly-Minted Swap Shop Can Feel GoodAbout Lack
of Cash, GUARDIAN, July 13, 1995, at 9. One commentator has challenged the
perception that such departures are benign. As he has pointed out, many LETS suffer
from an over-accumulation problem. In other words, LETS participants who have
provided services cannot find an outlet for their excess credits because the persons who
accepted their services never provided any in return. Departing freeloaders deprive the
LETS of the work energy it needs to survive. See Mark Jackson, The Problem of OverAccumulation: Examining and Theorisingthe StructuralForm of LETS (visited April
10, 1998) <http://www.bendigo.latrobe.edu.au/arts/ijccr/IMJ.htm>.
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bearer one or more cyber-units 18 To guard against counterfeiting, units
would bear the digital signature of the issuing authority and would be
designed so that they could be moved from one computer or storage
medium to another, but not copied. As in the Ithaca HOURS program,
the Internet community would release a limited number of cyber-units
to each community member who was willing to offer goods or services
in exchange for cyber-units.2 z 9 Once trading begins, members might use

software to transmit units electronically to each other, storing units on
their hard drives. Alternatively, as explained in Part I above, the
community could distribute computer-chip cards loaded with cyberunits, and members could use computers equipped with card readers to
transmit units to each other over the Internet.22

Under either system, how would the cyber-unit be valued? Some
British LETS declare that a single currency unit equals one pound
sterling. 2 ' Similarly, the Internet community could correlate the cyberunit to the dollar, or another government currency. However, for
reasons explained more fully below, a transnational community could
prefer a currency valued independently of government currency.222
Towards this end, the Internet community could use online catalogs or
other pricing information to help members understand what goods and
services cost in the new currency. Given enough time and continued
use, members would develop an independent sense of what the cyberunit was worth. Under this alternative scenario, the value of the unit
would float independently of the dollar or other currencies.223
Would the cyber-unit be redeemable in government currency (like
dollars) or in gold, stock, commodities, or other assets? The answer
might depend on its purpose. If, as explained below, the purpose were
to provide economic support for members,224 the community might
prefer a non-redeemable cyber-unit. On the other hand, the community
might want only to encourage a sense of belonging22 or to facilitate
transnational trade. Then, the community could make the unit
redeemable in a government currency like the dollar or other assets with

218. For the reasons explained in note 45, supra, these digital "notes" would not be
negotiable under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
219. See Solomon, supranote 20, at 75.
220. See supratext accompanying notes 6 & 54-55.
221. See Boliver, supranote 204, at 38.
222. See infra Part II.D.
223. Cf. Solomon, supra note 20, at 76 (noting that catalog would allow value of
Ithaca Hours to float independently of dollar).
224. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 229-3 1.
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value in the outside world. However, to do this, the community would
need to maintain a reserve fund or asset pool large enough to ensure that
redemption requests could be honored.226
D. Why Have Community Electronic Currencies?
Having explained how a community electronic currency would
work, this Article next uses two hypotheticals to explore the advantages
such currencies would offer Internet communities. First, suppose that
amateur astronomers around the world decided to form an Internet
community for the purpose of exchanging observational data, CCD
photographic images, equipment, articles, and advice. Although these
astronomers might exchange some data and information for free, they
could charge each other for other items, ranging from CCD images of
Comet Hale-Bopp to used telescopes and accessories. However, before
transactions could occur, the astronomers would have to understand
what items cost; and, if prices were quoted in a wide variety of
currencies, confusion would result. Given the transnational character of
the community, the astronomers would need a common medium of
exchange, preferably denominated in a politically neutral unit. One
solution would be to use a global electronic currency, such as the hayek,
as their common medium of exchange. The advantage of this approach
is that hayeks earned through trade within the community could be spent
outside the community as well.
Alternatively, the astronomers could choose to devise and employ
a community electronic currency that would circulate only within their
own membership. Let us call this currency the "sagan," in honor of the
late astronomer.' Like the hayek, the sagan would serve as a common
medium of exchange necessary for efficient transnational trade. Online
catalogs and price lists would help the astronomers internalize the value
28
of their new currency. 1

226. The membership of an Internet community must be wealthy enough to use
sophisticated computers on a regular basis. Thus, for many communities, financial
problems would not pose a serious barrier to the establishment of a redemption fund.
227. Carl Sagan served as a Professor of Astronomy and Space Sciences at Cornell
University and advised NASA on the Mariner, Viking, and Voyager unmanned space

missions. He is perhaps best known for his public television series Cosmos and several
books that sought to make astronomy and space science accessible to a wider audience,
see, e.g., Carl Sagan, BILLIONS & BILLIONS: THOUGHTS ON LIFE AND DEATH AT THE
BRINK OF THE MILLENNIUM (1997).
228. See supraPart I.B.
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Unlike the hayek, however, the sagan would offer special social
benefits. Social bonding would be particularly important to Internet
communities, which would lack the sense of togetherness ordinarily
produced by sharing a physical location. Trade would help the
astronomers to build productive relationships with each other.229 As a
community electronic currency, the sagan would heighten this bond by
conveying a sense of identity - of belonging to a unique community,
distinct from the rest of society. In this sense, the sagan would serve the
same purpose as private or imaginary languages, which have already
begun to appear on the Internet." ° Moreover, by supplying a politically
neutral unit, the sagan would eliminate the corrosive effect that national
23
or political chauvinism might otherwise have on community ties.
Second, suppose that global animal rights advocates formed a
community on the Internet to provide a haven where their controversial
beliefs and advocacy projects could be shared and discussed. Assume
further that at least some ofthese advocates suffered ridicule, contempt,
and discrimination in employment and the marketplace as the result of
their beliefs. 2 Advocates who could not find employment would
233
benefit from increased opportunities to work for each other.
Advocates who could not otherwise gain access to necessary goods or
services would benefit from increased opportunities to trade with each
other. Of course, members could trade with each other using any

229. As one LETS advocate explained, "LETS gives [people] a tangible way to be
neighbourly. It's a way of getting to know people, but it's not just a social circle.
People are trading skills and resources so there's a productive, positive relationship."
John Vidal, OtherLives: Take a Few PigsAlong to the Piein the Sky Cafe and Watch
Payment Go Bob-Bob-Bobbin 'Along, GUARDIAN, Mar. 12, 1994, at 25.
230. For example, the original television series Star Trek featured an alien race of
warriors known as the Klingons. The Internet now includes a site for the Klingon
Language Institute ("KLI"). The KLI has two main goals: first, to promote, foster, and
develop the Klingon language; and second, to unite Klingon linguists around the world
by providing a forum for discussion. See Lawrence M. Schoen & Mark Shoulson, The
Klingon Language Institute (visited Apr. 20,1998) <http://www.kli.org>.
231. See supraPart I.D.2.
232. Strong privacy could reduce such persecution by making it easier for animal
rights advocates to express their views while keeping their true identities hidden from
others. For a discussion of strong privacy, see supra Part I.B. However, to have a
significant impact on public opinion, advocates sometimes might find it necessary to
declare their views openly to potential converts or within the political arena.
233. Cf.Lynne Edmunds, SpecialReportBusinessChampions: Let's Put OurHeads
Together and Trade Jobs, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept 30, 1994, at 4; Alan Wheatley,
Bobbins,Acorns Revive Economy at CommunityLevel, REUTERS WORLD SERV., June 17,
1994 (explaining that LETS provide an outlet for the work energy of the unemployed
and elderly).
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common medium of exchange. However, by employing a nonredeemable electronic currency that could be spent only within its
membership, the community could further encourage such trade as a
means of expressing social solidarity."'
E. Should Government Regulate Community Electronic Currencies?
By reinforcing group identity and solidarity, community electronic
currencies may help Interet communities survive and thrive. But what
benefits would community electronic currencies offer society at large?
Any organization that brings like-minded individuals together
increases opportunities to engage in profftable trade, whether inside or
outside the organization. Although networking within any one Internet
community could be insignificant, networking within thousands of
communities, with millions of members, could significantly expand both
the scope and total amount of electronic commerce. Thus, community
electronic currencies could promote the widest range of electronic
commerce, enriching society as a whole.
Moreover, the rise of community electronic currencies would not
jeopardize existing policy goals. Even cumulatively, such currencies
would represent too small a portion of the money supply to complicate
its management.235
Moreover, given their limited circulation,
community electronic currencies would not pose a serious competitive
threat to the dollar and thus could neither threaten monetary policy, nor
undermine political power.236
Therefore, if the United States
government is sincerely interested in encouraging electronic commerce,
it should work to create a legal environment that would permit the rise
of community electronic currencies.
Fortunately, the legal landscape already looks relatively friendly
towards community electronic currencies. According to Professor Lewis
Solomon, federal law limits the private minting of metal coins,237 but

234. Cf Solomon, supra note 20, at 72; John Vidal, Bank to the Future,GUARDIAN,

Jan. 28, 1995, at 21 (arguing that LETS keep wealth within community, thereby
stimulating the local economy).
235. Cf supra Part I.E (explaining why global electronic currencies would not
compromise money management).
236. Cf supra Part I.E (explaining why global electronic currencies would not
jeopardize monetary policy or erode political power).
237. See Solomon, supra note 20, at 82-83. Federal law makes it a crime to issue
metal coins intended for use as current money. See 18 U.S.C. § 486 (1994); see also id.
§ 491(a) (prohibiting issuance of any coin, card, token, or device in metal intended to be
used as money). For a more detailed account of these statutes, see supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
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does not preclude issuance of paper currencies intended to circulate only
within a neighborhood LETS.23 Presumably then, federal law would
permit issuance of an electronic currency designed solely for limited
circulation within an Internet community. 9 Unfortunately, the presence
of a patchwork of laws in the fifty states could limit the use and
circulation of community electronic currencies.24 To eliminate such
barriers, Congress could enact legislation to authorize expressly the
issuance of community electronic currencies and to preempt state laws
to the contrary. On an international level, the United States could
propose a convention or model law that would acknowledge the utility
and legitimacy of such currencies.
Internet communities might also be concerned that federal or state
regulators would characterize credit balances as "deposits," thereby
" ' But
calling the full panoply of banking laws and regulations into play.24
this would be an absurd outcome, since the policy reasons for those laws

238. See Solomon, supranote 20, at 81-82. Federal law prohibits the issuance ofany
note, check, memorandum, token, or other obligation for a sum less than one dollar,
intended to circulate as money or to be received or used in lieu of lawful money of the
United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 336 (1994). However, the Supreme Court has held that
this law does not prohibit issuance of small notes redeemable in goods. See United
States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1877). The Court reasoned that Congress
intended to protect U.S. currency from competition, but did not mean to interfere with
notes having only limited circulation within a neighborhood. See id. at 367-68.
For further discussion of the statute and case law, see supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
239. An electronic currency like the cyber-unit would not be intended to circulate as
money in competition with the money of the United States. See Van Auken, 96 U.S. at
368. Unless made redeemable in cash, the cyber-unit would be payable only in goods
or services. Furthermore, the cyber-unit would circulate only within the Internet
community. See id.
The community could sidestep this issue altogetherby giving the cyber-unit a value
greater than one dollar. See 18 U.S.C. § 336 (1994); see supra note 102.
240. See Solomon, supra note 20, at 85-86. On the one hand, a currency intended
to circulate only within one Internet community might not offend state laws that prohibit
the issuance of notes that would circulate as money. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 648
(West 1988); see also supranote 102 (discussing similar federal laws). On the other
hand, an Internet community using an electronic currency could run afoul of laws that
prohibit payment of wages in scrip, merchandise, or any form other than in money. See,
e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 212 (West 1989).
This Article does not include a thorough survey of possibly relevant laws in the
fifty states for the reasons given earlier. See supra note 100.
241. This risk would be greater if the community utilized a central computer or
bookkeeper system. See supra note 50. In such a system, the credit balance of each
member might be considered an account, which the member accessed through payment
orders issued to the computer or bookkeeper. For a discussion of deposit-taking as
banking, see supratext accompanying notes 121-25.
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and regulations would not be seriously implicated. Granted, one or more
currencies could collapse due to mismanagement, causing some unlucky
participants to lose the value of their credits.242 But given their
extremely limited circulation and idiosyncratic nature, community
electronic currencies are unlikely to inspire panics or otherwise threaten
the payments system as a whole.243 Therefore, regulators like the Fed
should not only acknowledge that our banking laws and regulations
would not apply to community electronic currencies, but work to obtain
similar concessions from foreign regulators.
IH. CONCLUSION
Global electronic commerce would benefit from two distinct types
of privately issued, denominated, and managed electronic currencies.
One type, global electronic currencies, would function within the
cybermarket as efficient media of exchange, politically neutral units of
currency, and stable stores of value. Another type, community
electronic currencies, would function within specific Internet
communities to strengthen socialbonds and facilitate transnational trade.
At this time, neither type would pose a serious threat to government
control over economic or monetary policy, nor jeopardize the payments
system. Accordingly, the United States should act to eliminate
unnecessary regulatory clutter - and, if necessary, should enact new
laws specifically authorizing the private sector to develop global and
community electronic currencies, subject to as few regulatory restraints
as possible. Similarly, the United States should push hard on the
international scene to eliminate negative attitudes and regulatory barriers
found in other countries.
President Clinton and Vice-President Gore have articulated a
striking vision of a global electronic commerce that can enhance the
wealth and lives of individuals around the world. However, this vision
will mean nothing unless the government acts to implement it. The
government can take a step in the right direction, by encouraging private
companies to issue their own currencies for use on the Internet.

242. In the context ofcommunity electronic currencies, runs would notpose the most
serious threat. Indeed, for systems utilizing non-redeemable currencies, runs would be
impossible. Rather, community electronic currencies are most likely to founder when
free riders leave the system without contributing services, thereby causing other
members to accumulate large credit balances that cannot be spent See supranote 217.
243. Cf supra Part I.F.2 (reasoning that the insolvency of a single issuer of global
electronic currencies should not threaten the entire financial system).
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